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The Endurance of the Felony-Murder Rule:




The felony-murder rule cannot help but fascinate.' It has deep but
terribly obscure historical roots.' It is one of four traditional branches on
the tree of murder,3 yet clearly the odd one out.4 It permits severe
* Professor of Law, University of Iowa College of Law. B.A. 1973, University of
Southern California; J.D. 1976, UCLA School of Law. My research assistants, Kristy
Albrecht, Ken Duker, and David Ketchmark, deserve much credit for their conscientious
and able aid in the preparation of this Article. I am grateful to Jacki Williams for her
monumental efforts to overcome computer difficulties and produce a coherent manuscript.
I am also indebted to the University of Iowa for funding the research leave that enabled me
to undertake this project.
1. See People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304, 306 (Mich. 1980) (noting felony-murder
doctrine has "perplexed generations of law students, commentators, and jurists").
2. See George P Fletcher, Reflections on Felony Murder, 12 Sw. U. L. REV 413,
421 (1980-1981) (describing "historical roots" of felony-murder as "tenuous and ill
defined"); Nelson E. Roth & Scott E. Sundby, The Felony-Murder Rule: A Doctrine at
Constitutional Crossroads, 70 CORNELL L. REv 446, 449-50 (1985) (discussing "disputed
origins" of rule); ud. at 492 (stating that doctrine arose from "obscure historical origins");
see also infra part M.
3. The other three traditional branches of the murder tree, also described as the three
variations of actual malice, are intent to kill, intent to cause grievous bodily harm, and
depraved heart or gross recklessness murder. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W SCOTT,
JR., CRIMINAL LAW 605, 615-621 (2d ed. 1986).
4. See Aaron, 299 N.W.2d at 326 (concluding that it is inappropriate to equate intent
to commit felony with forms of actual malice otherwise needed for murder conviction);
Note, Felony Murder- A Tort Law Reconceptualization, 99 HARV L. REV 1918, 1919
(1986) [hereinafter Note, TortLaw] (describing rule as "an anomaly in the law of homicide"
because it requires no mental state to be proven with respect to death); Andrea Rosenthal,
Note, People v. Patterson: Cwnging the Second Degree Felony Murder Doctrine, 25 U.S.F
L. REV 123, 125 (1990) (asserting that felony-murder is "exception to general rule" that
malice is element of murder); Tamu Sudduth, Comment, The Dillon Dilemma: Finding
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punishment for the most heinous of offenses in some cases that can
appropriately be described as accidents.' In its classic form, the operation
of the rule follows a compellingly simple, almost mathematical, logic: a
felony + a killing = a murder. Abandoned by its motherland,6 the felony-
murder rule, like so many outcasts, has found a ruche in America.'
I should make it clear from the start that I approach this task with an
intent neither to praise nor bury the felony-murder rule. The former would
be disingenuous, the latter impossible.' Nor is it my purpose to demon-
Proportionate Felony-Murder Punishments, 72 CAL. L. REV 1299, 1306 (1984) (observing
that intent to commit felony is not like other mental states associated with crime of murder).
5. I will suggest later that members of the public might well not agree with the
description of such killings as "accidental." See infra text accompanying notes 173-82.
Unless otherwise indicated, my use of the term is consistent with the usage of other
scholars. An accidental killing is one in which none of the recognized forms of mens rea
is attributable to the person who caused the death-that is, he or she did not purposely,
knowingly, recklessly, or negligently bring about the loss of life.
6. The doctrine was a common law creation in England. See SANFORD H. KADISH
& STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 514 (5th ed. 1989). With
the 1957 enactment of the following provision, Parliament abolished the doctrine:
Where a person kills another in the course or furtherance of some other
offence, the killing shall not amount to murder unless done with the same
malice aforethought (express or implied) as is required for a killing to amount
to murder when not done in the course or furtherance of another offence.
Homicide Act of 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, ch. 11, § 1 (Eng.).
7 See LAFAVE & SCoTr, supra note 3, at 640-41 (noting that felony-murder is "well
entrenched in American law"); 2 CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW 204
(14th ed. 1979) (observing that felony-murder has "flourished" in America); Fletcher, supra
note 2, at 417 (opining that American "devotion to felony-murder" is like its devotion to
capital punishment); David Lanham, Felony Murder-Ancient and Modern, 7 CRIM. L.J. 90,
90-91 (1983) (discussing American courts' treatment of doctrine as "well-established and
legitimate"); Michelle L. Gilbert, Note, A Comparative Review of States' Recognition of
Reduced Degrees of Felony-Murder, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REv 1601, 1605 (1983) (asserting
that all but three states retain some version of felony-murder).
8. It would be disingenuous for me to praise the felony-murder rule because, like
most scholars, I continue to believe that the concept is misguided in principle, unnecessary
in practice, and inappropriate in symbolism. It would be impossible for me to bury the
felony-murder rule because others more able than I, and armed with every logical and
persuasive tool in the scholarly arsenal, have tried and failed. While scholars might well
deserve credit for much of the limitation of the doctrine, the scholarly pleas for abolition
have met stem resistance and have had little success. See Kevin Cole, Killings During
Crime: Toward a Discnmmating Theory of Strict Liability, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REV 73, 73-74
(1991) (concluding that despite uniform hostility of commentators rule remains "quite
durable"); David Crump & Susan W Crump, In Defense of the Felony Murder Doctrine,
1430
FELONY-MURDER RULE
strate how fundamentally flawed the crime of felony-murder is. That path
is much too worn. 9 My goal is more modest: to understand how a rule of
law that has been maligned so mercilessly for so long and that is putatively
irreconcilable with basic premses of modem crimnal jurisprudence has
survived' ° and promises to persist into the twenty-first century 11
8 HARv J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 359, 359 (1985) ("Scholarly denunciation has had little effect
upon its retention.").
9. The scholarly community has not had many favorable things to say about the
felony-murder rule. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 commentary at 37 (1980) (noting that
it is difficult to find "[p]rmeipled argument in favor of felony-murder"); Crump & Crump,
supra note 8, at 359 (stating that few scholars have tried to articulate policies that support
doctrine); id. at 395-98 (accusing scholars of "superficial" analysis of justifications for
felony-murder). Commentators have "almost universally condemned" the felony-murder
rule. Lynne H. Rambo, An Unconstitutional Fiction: The Felony-Murder Rule as Applied
to the Supply of Drugs, 20 GA. L. REV 671, 674 (1986); see also Lanham, supra note 7,
at 90 n.2 (stating that "[tihe rule has many critics"); Jeanne H. Seibold, Note, The Felony-
Murder Rule: In Search of a Viable Doctrine, 23 CATH. LAW 133, 134 n.1 (1978)
(asserting that "doctrine has been the subject of vitriolic criticism for centuries").
For some idea of the criticism leveled against the rule, see LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra
note 3, at 632, 640; Cole, supra note 8, at 74-77; Isabel Grant & A. Wayne MacKay,
Constructive Murder and the Charter- In Search of Principle, 25 ALBERTA L. REv 129,
133, 156-57 (1987); Lanham, supra note 7, at 101, Rosenthal, supra note 4, at 126; Roth
& Sundby, supra note 2, at 446, 491, Seibold, supra at 134 n.1, 162; Sudduth, supra note
4, at 1306-07; Note, Tort Law, supra note 4, at 1918, 1935.
In recent years, a few adventurous commentators have endeavored to furmsh
substantive arguments in support of the concept of felony-murder. See Frederick C.
Moesel, Jr., A Survey of Felony Murder, 28 TEMP. L.Q. 453, 466 (1955). See generally
Cole, supra note 8; Crump & Crump, supra note 8.
10. Even its critics have conceded that the rule is a survivor. See People v Aaron,
299 N.W.2d 304, 307 (Mich. 1980) (describing rule as "historic survivor"); MODEL PENAL
CODE § 210.2 commentary at 40 (1980) (noting that, in general, attacks on rule m United
States have not succeeded); GEORGE P FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW § 4.4.7, at
317-18 (1978) (alleging that "durability of the felony-murder rule is manifest" and noting
that doctrine has "survived the onslaught [of the California Supreme Court]"); Fletcher,
supra note 2, at 415 (conceding that by and large rule has been retained); Lanham, supra
note 7, at 101 (complaining of doctrine's survival into 20th century); Roth & Sundby, supra
note 2, at 446 (conceding that doctrine has shown "great resiliency" and that it "persists in
a vast majority of states" despite "widespread criticism"); Seibold, supra note 9, at 135-36
(opining that doctrine has survived criticism and retains significant viability); Note, Tort
Law, supra note 4, at 1918 (observing that scholarly and judicial attacks have had quite
limited success).
11. See LAFAvE & SCOTT, supra note 3, at 641 (predicting continued existence of rule
"for many years to come"); Seibold, supra note 9, at 150 (concluding that rule's "continued
existence is assured").
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My intent is not to provide a single, coherent solution to or explanation
of the felony-murder puzzle. My object, instead, is to identify many of its
pieces." An examnation of these pieces will provide insight into the role
of history and the effect of politics in forming and preserving our law It
may also spur productive reflection upon the differences among scholars',
lawmakers', and citizens' conceptions of criminal law, in particular, and the
institution of law, more generally Perhaps the study of a rule that has
withstood an avalanche of negative scholarship will reveal shortcomings in
scholarly thought;" perhaps it will simply confirm the deficiencies of
felony-murder and the fortuity of some legal rules. It might (perish the
thought) suggest a need to reexamine the prermses on which so many of us
who study the criminal law operate or (worse yet) call into question our
single-minded devotion to rationality 4
Part II sketches the felony-murder rule, certain widely-accepted
modem principles of culpability, and the ways in which the former is not
consistent with the latter. Part II discusses the history of the doctrine in
England and the United States. The discussion places special emphasis on
changes in the law and in society that make it highly questionable to engraft
the classic rule onto the modem world. Part IV explores the primary
justification offered for the contemporary felony-murder doc-
trine-deterrence. This Part focuses on the reasons that deterrence is a
theoretically and empirically vulnerable foundation for the felony-murder
rule. Part V posits a variety of vectors that have conspired to propel
felony-murder toward the twenty-first century History, the politics of law
and order and of life and death, the restricted scope of the felony-murder
rule in modem times, and the public's and lawmakers' conceptions of
culpability, blameworthiness, and criminal liability have all contributed to
the rule's perpetuation.
12. Like Professor Fletcher, my purpose is "to probe the legislative romance with the
felony-murder rule." Fletcher, supra note 2, at 415.
13. See Crump & Crump, supra note 8, at 360 (speculating that public officials might
possess insights that scholars lack with regard to felony-murder doctrine).
14. See, e.g., Note, Tort Law, supra note 4, at 1933 (complaining that felony-murder
has "no rational basis"). I plead guilty to being the slave of logic and rationality At times,
however, I have wondered whether we lawyers place a bit too much faith in the ability of
logic and rationality to lead to the best answers to legal and social problems. While not at
all prepared to foreswear rational thought, I have begun to sense that there is some truth in
Lord Salmon's admonition that "[a]bsolute logic in human affairs is an uncertain guide and
a very dangerous master." D.P.P v Majewski, 2 All E.R. 142, 158 (H.L. 1976).
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If my enterprise sheds light on our apparently inseverable attachment
to felony-murder, that will be enough. If its lessons extend beyond the
rule, or even beyond the criminal law, so much the better.
II. The Felony-Murder Rule, Modem Culpability, and the
Tension Between Them
In its starkest, broadest form, the felony-murder rule provides that the
killing of another human being in the furtherance of any felonious
enterprise constitutes the crime of murder. 5 It would seem, however, that
the instances in which this pristine, capacious version of the rule has
remained the controlling law are rare.' 6 It certainly is not the predominant
law in our nation today 17 In fact, states have enacted a variety of quite
15. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 commentary at 30 (1980) (describing classic
formulation of rule as including any felony); LAFAVE & ScOTr, supra note 3, at 622 (stating
that at one time in English common law nature of felony did not matter); Gilbert, supra note
7, at 1601 (stating that common-law felony-murder rule defined any homicide during felony
as murder).
The explanation for the rule is that "[a]t common law malice was implied as a matter
of law for homicides arising from felonies." WILLIAM L. CLAMR & WILLIAM L. MARSHALL,
A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMES 656 (Marian Q. Barnes ed., 7th ed. 1967); see also
People v. Patterson, 778 P.2d 549, 557 (Cal. 1989) (felony-murder rule posits existence of
malice from commission of felony, thus rendering actual malice irrelevant); Erwin S.
Barbre, Annotation, What Felomes Are Inherently or Foreseeably Dangerous to Human Life
for Purposes of Felony-Murder Doctnne, 50 A.L.R.3d 397, 399-400 (1973) (explaining that
malice involved in felony is "transferred" or "imputed" to classify killing as murder).
16. Not long after the rule gamed a foothold, the efforts to limit its scope began. See,
e.g., Regina v. Seine, 16 Cox Crim. Cas. 311, 313 (1887) (holding felony-murder branch
of murder requires finding that person of common intelligence would be aware that felonious
conduct poses danger to human life). Those efforts have continued unabated in modern
times. See, e.g., People v Smith, 678 P.2d 886, 887 (Cal. 1984) (holding felony with
purpose of infliction of physical injury or pain on victim merges into homicide and cannot
be basis for felony-murder rule); People v Phillips, 414 P.2d 353, 360 (Cal. 1966)
(concluding felony must be inherently dangerous to human life in abstract to qualify for
second degree felony-murder rule); State v Canola, 374 A.2d 20, 30 (N.J. 1977)
(interpreting statutory felony-murder rule as limiting operation to cases in which felon
commits actual lethal act).
17 See People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304, 312 (Mich. 1980) (stating that limitations
of felony-murder doctrine have been adopted by most states); State v Doucette, 470 A.2d
676, 680 (Vt. 1983) (observing that majority of states have limited felony-murder rule);
FLETCHER, supra note 10, § 4.4.4, at 293 (asserting that "dominant trend" has been "toward
limitation and refinement" of felony-murder rule); ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N.
BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAw 64-65 (3d ed. 1982) (observing that in United States only few states
retain broad, unlimited rule and that all others have limited it); Crump & Crump, supra note
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different versions of felony-murder,"8 some have abandoned it entirely, 9
and the law is anything but stable. Most American jurisdictions have a
restricted form of the rule that applies only when a felon acting in
furtherance of one of a certain, limited group of felomes commits a lethal
act that kills another human being.2"
To understand the primary indictment of the core concept of felony-
murder, one must appreciate the contemporary scholarly approach to
8, at 377 (noting "widespread agreement" that rule requires limitation, that application to
"any felony" results in "irrational grading").
18. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 3, at 622 (noting that law of felony-murder
today "varies substantially"); Lanham, supra note 7, at 100 (asserting that rule has been
subject of "a variety of treatments in different jurisdictions and at different times"); M.
Susan Doyle, Note, People v Patterson: California's Second Degree Felony-Murder
Doctrine at "The Brink of Logical Absurdity", 24 LoY. L.A. L. REV 195, 200-01 (1990)
(stating that doctrine varies from state to state). For sample variations, see, e.g., ALA.
CODE § 13A-6-2(a)(3) (1994) (restricting felony-murder to enumerated felonies or "any
other felony clearly dangerous to human life"); ALASKA STAT. § 11-41.110(a)(3) (West
Supp. 1993) (limiting felony-murder to enumerated felonies); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-
102(a)(1) (Michie 1993) (confining doctrine to deaths caused during any felony "under
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life"); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 782.04 (West Supp. 1994) (creating three degrees of felony-murder: enumerated
felonies in which felon kills, enumerated felonies in which nonfelon kills, and non-
enumerated felonies in which felon kills); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-1 (Michie 1992) (allowing
any felony to support felony-murder conviction); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 1
(West 1990) (limiting rule to felonies with punishment of death or life imprisonment).
19. See, e.g., HAw REV STAT. §§ 707-701, 707-701.5 (Supp. 1992) (eliminating
felony-murder rule); KY. REV STAT. ANN. § 507.020(1)(a) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990)
(same); People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304, 324-26 (Mich. 1980) (reinterpreting malice as
not including commission of felony, thereby abolishing felony-murder doctrine).
20. The two limitations made explicit in this descnption are: (1) that not all felonies
can be the basis of felony-murder prosecutions, see Aaron, 299 N.W.2d at 316 n.79
(majority of states with statutory felony-murder rule enumerate list of felonies that qualify);
PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 17, at 70 (except where legislatively changed, felony-murder
in United States today makes homicide murder if it results from perpetration or attempted
perpetration of inherently dangerous felony), and (2) that one of the felons must commit the
actual killing act, see State v. Canola, 374 A.2d 20, 23 (N.J. 1977) (stating "agency" rule
that requires lethal act to be committed by felon is adhered to by large majority of
jurisdictions).
Another limitation recognized by several jurisdictions is that the party killed not be
one of the felons. See, e.g., People v Kittrell, 786 P.2d 467, 469 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989)
(citing statute that provides culpability only for "death of a person, other than one of the
participants"). It is unclear, however, whether this view is presently followed in a majority
of the states. See generally Martin J. McMahon, Annotation, Application of Felony Murder
Doctrine Where Person Killed was Co-Felon, 89 A.L.R.4th 683 (1991).
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culpability and fault.2 The requirement of mens rea, or a guilty mind, as
a basis for criminal liability is nothing new The criminal law of England
recognized that notion fairly early on? The content or meaning of that
requirement, however, has evolved substantially Originally, the concept
was vague and imprecise; any badness or wrongfulness qualified.'
Eventually, a variety of more specific culpable mental states began to take
shape. Notions of intent, recklessness, and negligence developed to reflect
varying degrees of mental culpability and, therefore, of fault. 24
21. By referring to the "scholarly" approach, I do not mean to suggest that others do
not understand culpability in the same way I only mean to emphasize that this view is
prevalent in the scholarly community
22. See LAFAvE & ScoTr, supra note 3, at 193 (asserting that guilty mind requirement
is one of "basic premises which underlie the whole of the Anglo-American substantive
criminal law" and "have been of great importance in shaping the criminal law"); id. at 212
(stating that although in earliest times common-law judges did not require mens rea, from
about 1600 forward they prescribed "bad state of mind requirement"); PETER W Low ET
AL., CRIMINAL LAW 194 (2d ed. 1986) (asserting that while origins of common-law mens
rea demand are not clear, it is clear that such general requirement has existed for centuries);
Paul H. Robinson, A Bef History of Distinctions in Criminal Culpability, 31 HASTINGS L.J.
815, 825-30 (1980); Note, Tort Law, supra note 4, at 1923 (declaring that mens rea
principle has long been cornerstone of just criminal law system).
23. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 commentary at 31 (1980) (noting that mens rea
demand at one time referred merely to "general criminal disposition" rather than specific
mental attitude toward elements of crime); Low ET AL., supra note 22, at 195-96 (discussing
fact that mens rea, in earlier times, "smacked strongly of general moral blameworthiness")
(quoting Francis B. Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARv L. REv 974, 988 (1932)); Robinson, supra
note 22, at 821 (observing that early mental state distinctions were only between "wilful"
and "accidental").
24. The text might suggest that the picture became more clear and precise than it
actually did. Quite a number of ill-defined mental state requirements persisted and are
present today in statutory definitions of crimes. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02
commentary at 230 n.3 (1980) (observing that one reason for reform proposals in federal
system was that there were "76 different methods of stating the requisite mental element in
present federal criminal statutes"); see, e.g., ARIz. REv STAT. ANN. § 32-1696(A)(9)
(Supp. 1993) (making it crime for optician to unprofessionally conduct practice of optical
dispensing); CAL. PENAL CODE § 95 (West Supp. 1994) (making it crime to corruptly
attempt to influence juror); id. § 288 (making it crime to lewdly commit lewd or lascivious
act with child); td. § 337e (West 1988) (making it crime to dishonestly umpire sporting
event); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 256.051(2) (West 1991) (making it crime to contemptuously
abuse flag or emblem of Florida).
There has been steady movement, however, toward the sort of clarity, consistency,
uniformity, and precision exemplified by § 2.02 of the Model Penal Code. In that section,
the drafters specified the four mental states-purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and
negligence-that they believed were sufficient to encompass virtually all of the culpable
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In addition, the demand that the state prove fault for every necessary
component of a criminal offense gained acceptance. According to this
view, an individual is not responsible for an offense unless he or she has
the requisite mens rea for each essential element of that offense.is The
underlying premises of this position are straightforward. Liability for a
particular offense requires fault for that offense. Fault for a particular
offense requires that an individual have a blameworthy mental attitude
toward all of the components that the law deems essential to constitute that
offense.2
mmdsets necessary for a comprehensive criminal code. Moreover, they specified the
definitions of each term with as much precision as was linguistically and pragmatically
possible.
Regina v Cunningham, 41 Crim. App. 155 (Crim. App. 1957), provides a good
example of judicial implementation of the principle that mens rea refers to particular mental
states, not just general wrongfulness. In Cunningham, the defendant was charged with
"maliciously" causing a noxious substance to be administered to a woman so as to endanger
her life. Id. at 157-58. The trial judge instructed the jurors that they should find that the
defendant met the "malicious" requirement if his actions were "wicked." Id. at 160.
Because it was larcenous conduct that resulted in the administration of coal gas to the
victim, it was no surprise that the jury convicted.
On appeal, the court held that general wickedness was not enough. Id. at 160-61.
Rather, the State had to prove that the defendant intentionally or recklessly caused the harm
proscribed by the statute. Id. at 161. In other words, it was not enough that Cunningham
was a wicked person who caused a noxious substance to be administered to the woman and
thereby endangered her life. Cunningham had to intentionally or recklessly administer the
substance and bring about such endangerment.
25. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 commentary at 229 (1980) (observing that § 2.02
"expresses the basic requirement that unless some element of mental culpability is
proved with respect to each material element of the offense, no valid criminal conviction
may be obtained").
26. Regina v. Faulkner, 13 Cox Crnm. Cas. 550 (1877), provides a good illustration
of this principle at work in the late 1800s. In Faulkner, the trial judge instructed the jury
that the defendant could be convicted of "maliciously" damaging a ship if he set it on fire
during the course of a felonious act. Id. at 551. Because the defendant had been stealing
rum at the time he set the blaze that damaged the ship, he was guilty under the judge's
instruction. Id.
On appeal, however, the court held that the maliciousness required by the statute
referred to a culpable mental state-at least recklessness-with regard to the property
damage element of the crime. Id. Even a thief could not be convicted for causing the
damage if he did so "accidentally "
The court believed that an intent to steal rendered one liable for theft, but that
liability for criminal damage required more than an intent to steal and more than an intent
to perform the conduct that resulted in the damage. Because the essence of the criminal
offense was damage to another's property, liability for the offense required a culpable
1436
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Thus, putting aside the public welfare offenses that seek to achieve
maximum deterrence through the device of strict liability, it is the widely
accepted view today that crmunal liability must rest on proof of a
recognized level of mental fault for every essential element of an offense.27
Larceny, for example, rmght well require that one intentionally take an item
of property, that one know it belongs to another person, and that one intend
to deprive that person of the item permanently I Rape might well require
that one intentionally engage in intercourse and that one be at least
negligent with regard to whether the intercourse is nonconsensual.29
The third aspect of modem scholarly thought that is implicit in some
of the foregoing is the demand for liability proportionate to culpability
According to this position, offenses should be graded as more or less
serious according to the level of mental fault established.3" Thus, if a
attitude toward the damage that was done. In other words, to be blameworthy for the
offense, an individual had to have a guilty mind for the element that was an integral
constituent of the crime contemplated and defined by Parliament.
27 See Low Er AL., supra note 22, at 233 (stating that "[a ]s many as half of the states
have adopted [Model Penal Code-like] culpability provisions" and that Model Penal Code's
culpability provision "has had an important impact on the decisional law" in states that "still
base the culpability inquiry on the common law").
28. See CLARK & MARSHALL, supra note 15, at 824-25 (opining that mens rea
required for larceny is "intent, without bona fide claim of right, and with the objective of
any personal benefit and gain, to take another's property permanently" and that it is not
larceny to take another's property "by accident" or under good faith "claim of ownership
or right"); LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 3, at 721-22 (discussing "intent to steal"
requirement of larceny and addressing its inconsistency with belief that property does not
belong to another); STEWART RAPALJE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF LARCENY AND
KINDRED OFFENSES 3 (Chicago, Wait 1892) (defining common-law larceny as "the
felonious, wrongful, and fraudulent taking and carrying away by any person, of the personal
goods of another, with the felonious intent to convert them to his own use and make them
his property, without the consent of the owner"); see also State v Waltz, 2 N.W 1102,
1103 (Iowa 1879) (holding that evidence that accused horse thief believed that owner never
acquired title to horses because sale to him was sham should have been admitted because
it was material to larceny charge).
29. See State ex rel. M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1279 (N.J. 1992) (holding that for
second degree sexual assault conviction, state must prove either that defendant did not
actually believe that victim had freely given permission to intercourse or that his belief to
that effect was unreasonable); JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 33.06,
at 526-27 (1987) (stating that under common law not only must defendant's conduct be
intentional but he must be at least negligent regarding victim's lack of consent).
30. See Roth & Sundby, supra note 2, at 459 (referring to "progressive trend of
categorizing homicide according to the degree of culpability" proven); cf. H.L.A. HART,
LAW, LmERTY AND MORALITY 36-37 (1963) (suggesting that "there are many reasons why
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person inadvertently creates an unreasonable risk of death and kills, he
might be liable for negligent homicide. 3' A killing caused by recklessness,
that is, conscious disregard of an unreasonable risk of death, could
constitute the more serious offense of involuntary manslaughter. 32  An
intentional or grossly reckless killing could be murder in the second
degree.33 And a deliberate and premeditated murder might be the highest
possible offense, first degree murder.34 The more deserving of blame and
condemnation the proven mental attitude of the offender, the more severe
the potential categorization and punishment.
Every true variation of the felony-murder rule' is to some extent
inconsistent with these contemporary notions of culpability and fault. The
broadest version of the doctrine makes even an accidental killing-one
caused by nonnegligent conduct-murder.36  If a death is accidental, then
by definition the state can prove no mental fault (not even negligence, the
we might wish the legal gradation of the seriousness of crimes, expressed m its scale of
punishments, not to conflict with common estimates of their comparative wickedness" and
arguing that one can consistently assert that point of punishment is prevention and still
adhere to "principles which make relative moral wickedness of different offenders a partial
determinant of the severity of punishment").
31. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-4 (1994); LA. REv STAT. ANN. § 14:32 (West
Supp. 1994); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.10 (McKinney 1987); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-16-03
(1985); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.05 (West 1994); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-107 (1988);
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.4 (1980).
32. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-56 (West 1985); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 565.024 (Vernon Supp. 1994); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2504 (1983); TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 19.04 (West 1994); MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 (1980).
33. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV STAT. ANN. § 13-1104 (Supp. 1993); HAW. REV STAT.
§ 707-701.5 (Supp. 1992); LA. REv STAT. ANN. § 14:30.1 (West Supp. 1994); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 609.19 (West Supp. 1994); N.Y PENAL LAW § 125.25 (McKinney 1987 &
Supp. 1994); WASH. REV CODE ANN. § 9A.32.050 (West 1988).
34. See, e.g., ARIz. REV STAT. ANN. § 13-1105 (Supp. 1993); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 189 (West Supp. 1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04 (West Supp. 1994); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 707.2 (West 1993); WASH. REv CODE ANN. § 9A.32.030(1)(a) (West Supp. 1994).
35. By a "true variation" I mean one in which the felony takes the place of mens rea
entirely or at least elevates the offense to a level higher than the level otherwise appropriate
for the mens rea proven. If the categorization of a crime is consistent with the actual degree
of mental fault proven, then the offense is not, in my view, a "true variation" of the felony-
murder concept.
36. See Grant & MacKay, supra note 9, at 136 (stating felony-murder rule treats
"accidental, negligent, reckless and intentional killings" all alike, as murder); Barbre, supra
note 15, at 399-400 (stating felony-murder rule transfers or imputes malice to felon even if
his or her killing is "accidental").
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least culpable recognized state of mind) with regard to the element of
causing the death of another human being. Such a rule, therefore, is
disloyal to the principle that some level of mental fault is required for each
essential element.37
Our legal tradition ordinarily defines murder as a killing with at least
gross recklessness-a conscious disregard of a risk to human life of
sufficient magnitude to evince a callous or depraved indifference to the
value of human life.38  A felony-murder rule that by virtue of the
limitations imposed by courts or legislatures makes only negligent, or
grossly negligent, killings murder39 is untrue to the principle of gradation
37 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 commentary at 36 (1980) (stating that felony-
murder rule is inconsistent with requirement that culpability be proven with regard to
"homicide" element); Roth & Sundby, supra note 2, at 459 (asserting felony-murder rule
"effectively eliminates a mens rea element" by classifying homicide as murder "regardless
of the defendant's culpability" with regard to death).
38. The traditional and still common definition of murder is a killing with malice
aforethought. The essence of malice is this "callous or depraved indifference to human
life." Intentional or knowing killings qualify as murders because they satisfy this minimum
essence. In fact, they entail even more culpability than the mmunum indifference. Grossly
reckless killings also satisfy this minimum threshold for malice. See United States v.
Fleming, 739 F.2d 945, 947-48 (4th Cir. 1984) (malice does not require intent to kill or
injure but is satisfied by acts that indicate "a heart without regard for the life and safety
of others" or "depraved disregard of human life"), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1193 (1985);
Commonwealth v Malone, 47 A.2d 445, 447 (Pa. 1946) (concluding that "act of gross
recklessness for which [an individual] must reasonably anticipate that death to another is the
likely result" is act betraying "malice").
39. Some statutes, for example, restrict felony-murder liability to certain enumerated
felonies that, by nature, constitute gross or ordinary negligence with regard to human life.
See, e.g., ARIZ. REv STAT. ANN. § 13-1105 (1989 & Supp. 1993) (limiting felony-murder
to very specific felonies that involve great risk to human life); COLO. REv STAT. § 18-3-
102(1)(b) (1986 & Supp. 1993) (same); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-2401 (1989 & Supp. 1994)
(same). The judicial limitation of some felony-murder rules to felonies that are either
inherently dangerous to human life in the abstract, see, e.g., People v Patterson, 778 P.2d
549, 551 (Cal. 1989); State v. Underwood, 615 P.2d 153, 162-63 (Kan. 1980), or to those
that are either dangerous m the abstract or as committed in the particular case, see, e.g.,
Jenkins v State, 230 A.2d 262, 269 (Del. 1967), aff'd, 395 U.S. 213 (1969); State v
Thompson, 185 S.E.2d 666, 672-73 (N.C. 1972), seems to ensure that the offenders will
be at least negligent or grossly negligent in causing the deaths with which they are charged.
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 commentary at 37 (1980) (maintaining that restriction of
doctrine's application to felonies involving "foreseeable risk" of death "is a roundabout way
of limiting felony murder to cases of negligent homicide"); FLETCHER, supra note 10, at 301
(concluding that it is justified to conclusively presume "differential" or "incremental"
culpability only when felony is "inherently dangerous" and such "incremental culpability"
amounts to "negligence").
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proportionate to the established level of mental fault. Grossly or ordinarily
negligent killings typically amount to manslaughter or negligent hormcide.1°
Although a felony-murder nile that punishes "reckless" killings as murder 41
is less unfaithful, it still violates the same gradation principle. Reckless
killings are typically no more than manslaughter.42
The variety of felony-murder rule that requires proof of malice and
then elevates the crime to first degree murder because of the commssion
of a felony43 is also inconsistent with ordinary gradation principles. First
degree murder, the most heinous of offenses, generally requires proof of
the most culpable of all mental states-not just malice, but premeditation
and deliberation.'
40. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2504 (1983) (making grossly negligent killing
involuntary manslaughter); WASH. REV CODE ANN. § 9A.32.070 (West 1988) (providing
that killing "with criminal negligence" constitutes second degree manslaughter); State v
Barnett, 63 S.E.2d 57, 61 (S.C. 1951) (stating that killing with "ordinary negligence" in use
of "an inherently dangerous instrumentality" is involuntary manslaughter); supra note 31 and
accompanying text; see also Roth & Sundby, supra note 2, at 452 (asserting that punishment
of homicide as murder without proof of subjective culpability is not consistent with modem
mens rea requirements for offense of murder).
41. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 636(a)(2) (1992) (requiring recklessness in causing
death for some felony-murders).
42. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
43. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 18-4003 (1987 & Supp. 1994) (upgrading murder to first
degree murder if committed during certain enumerated felonies); MiCH. COMP LAWS ANN.
§ 750.316 (West 1991) (same).
44. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994) (making murders
perpetrated by any "willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing murder of the first
degree"); IOWA CODE ANN. § 707.2 (West 1992) (stating "murder in the first degree"
includes persons who kill "willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation").
Although a few states interpret "premeditation and deliberation" as synonymous with
a mere "intent to kill," the "better" interpretation holds that those terms connote more.
According to that view, actual forethought and reflection upon the idea of killing for some
period of time prior to the homicide is essential. See DRESSLER, supra note 29, at 458-59
(criticizing "intent to kill" view as "probably wrong as a matter of legislative intent" and
noting that "many courts" have adopted view that "it takes 'some appreciable time' to
premeditate"); LAFAvE & ScoTT, supra note 3, at 643 (calling more demanding approach
to premeditation and deliberation "better view" and one that is "growing in popularity").
Not all, however, agree that premeditation and deliberation, so defined, should be
considered the most culpable of mental states. The drafters of the Model Penal Code
rejected these traditional criteria for dividing murder into degrees because they believed that
the "generalization" they reflect, "that the person who plans ahead is worse than the person
who kills on sudden impulse," is not sound. While it is the case that some killers who
reflect beforehand are in fact more blameworthy than some who kill impulsively, it is also
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Thus, the major complaint about the felony-murder rule is that it
violates generally accepted principles of culpability Some versions,
including the classical statement of the rule, impose criminal liability for a
serious offense without proof of any culpability for the essential element of
death. Others entail proof of some culpability, but by categorizing the
crime as murder or first degree murder, they result in gradation at a
disproportionately severe level considering the established mental fault.
For these reasons, it is said that the rule is, among other things,
"abhor[r]ent,"'4 "anachronistic,"' "barbaric,"'47 "injudicious and unprinci-
pled,, 41 "parasitic, "'4  and a "modern monstrosity"' that "erodes the
relationship between criminal liability and moral culpability "' According
to the many opponents of the doctrine, individuals deserve to be punished
in accord with their moral failings. Because the felony-murder rule
sanctions individuals more severely than is their desert, it is a serious
anomaly in our law, an anomaly that ought to be abolished.'
the case that some who kill impulsively are in fact more blameworthy than some reflective
killers. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 commentary at 127-28 (1980). In other words,
the mental states described by the terms "premeditation" and "deliberation" do not reliably
isolate those who deserve the most severe treatment.
45. Grant & MacKay, supra note 9, at 157
46. See People v. Burroughs, 678 P.2d 894, 897 (Cal. 1984); People v Aaron, 299
N.W.2d 304, 307 (Mich. 1980); State v Ortega, 817 P.2d 1196, 1201 (N.M. 1991);
Rosenthal, supra note 4, at 126; Roth & Sundby, supra note 2, at 453.
47 See Burroughs, 678 P.2d at 897 n.3; People v Smith, 678 P.2d 886, 888 (Cal.
1984); People v Phillips, 414 P.2d 353, 360 n.6 (Cal. 1966); Lanham, supra note 7, at
101.
48. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d at 334.
49. Id. at 333 n.16.
50. Lanham, supra note 7, at 101.
51. People v. Patterson, 778 P.2d 549, 554 (Cal. 1989) (citing People v Washington,
402 P.2d 130, 134 (Cal. 1965)). According to two commentators, the criticism levelled
against the doctrine "constitutes a lexicon of everything that scholars and jurists can find
wrong with a legal doctrine." Roth & Sundby, supra note 2, at 446 (presenting wide array
of those criticisms).
52. See PERKINS &BOYCE, supra note 17, at 136-37 (opining that "abrogation" seems
"logical conclusion" of development of felony-murder doctrine); Lanham, supra note 7, at
101 (hoping that appreciation of history of rule leads to abolition or to restriction of its
scope); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Harm and Punishment: A Critique of Emphasis on the Results
of Conduct in the Criminal Law, 122 U. PA. L. REV 1497, 1606 (1974) (advocating
abolition because rule is unsupportable).
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IlL The Tenuous and Unclear History of Felony-Murder
I was once under the impression that the origins of felony-murder were
clearly documented and ascertainable.53 I also believed that, no matter how
nusguided and outdated the rule mght seem today, it was the deliberate
product of rational judicial lawmalang. Neither is the truth.
The felony-murder rule has been traced to a variety of sources. Some
say its source is Lord Dacre's Case." Others cite Mansell and Herbert's
Case, which was decided just one year later.55 Others contend that Lord
Coke fathered the doctrine in 1644.56 And at least one distinguished com-
mentator believes that the rule that a killing during a felony would automat-
ically become a murder was actually first promulgated by Sir Michael
Foster m 1762.1 Suffice it to say that prior to Foster there is no unambig-
uous authority m support of the rule-either from the commentators or the
courts. All of the putative earlier sources are subject to multiple mterpreta-
tions-that is, the nature of the rule they intended to endorse is uncertain.58
53. For discussions of the history of the felony-murder rule, see People v Aaron, 299
N.W.2d 304, 307-12 (Mich. 1980); 3 JAMES F STEPHEN, A HIsToRY OF THE CRIMINAL
LAW OF ENGLAND 56-57 (London, MacMillan 1883); J.M. Kaye, The Early History of
Murder and Manslaughter (pt. 2), 83 L.Q. REV 569, 569-87 (1967); Lanham, supra note
7, at 91-100; Roth & Sundby, supra note 2, at 449-50; Herbert Wechsler, Codification of
Crminal Law in the United States: The Model Penal Code, 68 COLUM. L. REv 1425, 1446-
47 (1968).
54. 72 Eng. Rep. 458 (K.B. 1535). See Norval Morrs, The Felon's Responsibility
for the Lethal Acts of Others, 105 U. PA. L. REV 50, 58 (1956); Note, Recent Extensions
of Felony-Murder Rule, 31 IND. L.J. 534, 534 n.3 (1956).
55. 73 Eng. Rep. 279 (K.B. 1536). See Kaye, supra note 53, at 577-82 (arguing that
English judiciary's first application of doctrine was Mansell and Herbert's Case); Note,
Felony Murder as a First Degree Offense: An Anadronism Retained, 66 Yale L.J. 427, 430-
31 n.23 (1957) (same); Gilbert, supra note 7, at 1603 n.11 (same).
56. See EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND *56 (1644); STEPHEN, supra note 53, at 57; ToRCIA, supra note 7, at 204;
Lanham, supra note 7, at 91-94; Moesel, supra note 9, at 453.
57 See FLETCHER, supra note 10, § 4.4.4, at 291.
58. Lanham suggests that Lord Coke actually meant to say that a killing during an
unlawful enterprise was "felonious," what today would be called manslaughter not murder.
Lanham, supra note 7, at 91-94. Fletcher also finds it "abundantly clear" that Coke did not
view an unlawful act as a basis for establishing malice. Rather, Coke, along with Hale and
Hawkins, merely viewed the commission of an unlawful act as a bar to the defendant's claim
that a killing was accidental. See FLETCHER, supra note 10, § 4.4.1, at 277-81, see also
Lanham, supra note 7, at 99 (opining that Blackstone's supposed statement of rule is
ambiguous and that he might actually have accepted Lord Hale's view that killing during
unlawful act is not murder).
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And some highly reputable sources, such as Lord Hale, rejected the
concept.5 9
In addition, neither the cases nor the commentators furmsh evidence
that the doctrine was the product of a conscious, deliberate reasoning
process designed to reflect or implement penal policies. Lord Coke simply
attributed the rule to judicial authorities that, in fact, provide no direct
support.60 Foster, too, in support of his statement of the felony-murder
rule, cited authorities that provided tenuous support, at best. 6' Neither
Coke nor Foster, therefore, persuasively demonstrated an origin m the
actual common law of England.62 Moreover, none of the classical
commentators' discussions of felony-murder demonstrate a serious
consideration of the penological appropriateness of the concept. It could be
that a deliberate reasoning process was behind the declarations of the rule
that emerged from the commentators, but such a process is not evident in
their works.63
59. See Lanham, supra note 7, at 95-96 (stating that Hale's writings are "uniformly
against the proposition" that causing death in course of unlawful act constitutes murder,
though he did rely on Coke for proposition that killings during unlawful acts were
manslaughters). According to Lanham, Dalton, a contemporary of Lord Coke, relied on
the same sources that Coke did but rejected the view that a killing during an unlawful act
was necessarily a murder. See id. at 94, 100.
60. See People v Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304, 309-10 (Mich. 1980); STEPHEN, supra
note 53, at 57-58; Lanham, supra note 7, at 91-92. Consequently, some scholars have
concluded that felony-murder was the "accidental" result of the good Lord Coke's mistakes.
See infra note 64. According to Lanham, Coke probably never intended to promulgate a
felony-murder rule. Rather, he meant that an unintended killing during an unlawful act
would be felonious-i.e., manslaughter. See Lanham, supra note 7, at 94.
61. See Lanham, supra note 7, at 97
62. Fletcher asserts that English common law never included the general rule that an
accidental killing in the course of a felony would constitute a murder; such a rule was not
mentioned until Foster rewrote the law in 1762. See FLETCHER, supra note 10, § 4.4.4, at
291; see also Fletcher, supra note 2, at 421 (maintaining that tenuous roots of felony-murder
doctrine are not found in judicial decisions but in scholarly commentaries).
63. See FLETCHER, supra note 10, § 4.4.1, at285 (stating that although Foster clearly
viewed any felonious intent as basis for finding malice, it is "not clear why that should be
true"); Roth & Sundby, supra note 2, at 450 nn.21-22 (asserting that purpose of felony-
murder was unclear, vague, and not fully articulated).
The absence of supporting reasons is apparent from a quick reading of the brief,
pertinent passages in the original works. See, e.g., 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTAR-
IES *200-01, COKE, supra note 56, at 56; MICHAEL FOSTER, A REPORT OF SOME PRO-
CEEDINGS ON THE COMMISSION FOR THE TRIAL OF THE REBELS IN THE YEAR 1746, IN THE
COUNTY OF SURRY; AND OF OTHER CROWN CASES 258-59 (London, Brooks, 3d ed. 1792).
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We are left, therefore, to make poorly-informed guesses about the his-
torical reasons for the felony-murder rule's birth. The rule might have been
an accident, the product of a misunderstanding of authorities. I Perhaps the
doctrine was intentionally designed to prevent one who killed-even
accidentally-in the course of an attempt to commit a felony from escaping
the punishment for a felony-death. 65 It may be that in a legal world that
saw all killings as murders-except those that were accidental or excus-
able-the concept made sense as a device calculated to preclude those with
unclean hands (felons) from avoiding punishment for murder by claiming
accident.' s Thereafter, the concept was simply converted without good
reason into an affirmative rule that automatically turned any killing in the
course of a felony into a murder.67 It is even possible that none of these
theories accurately explains why felony-murder came about.68 The reasons
64. See Aaron, 299 N.W.2d at 309-10 (observing that some see doctrine as product
of Coke's blunder in translating Bracton); Lanham, supra note 7, at 91 (asserting that it
is possible that whole doctrine is result of "slip of the quill on the part of Lord Coke");
Rambo, supra note 9, at 674 n.11 (stating that doctrine is said to have grown out of
mistakes).
65. See PERKiNs & BoYCE, supra note 17, at 136. According to this position, the
rule was developed to prevent those who killed during the perpetration of felonies that
failed-and thus amounted only to misdemeanor attempts-from escaping the punishment
that would have been imposed if they had succeeded with their felonies. It was thought
inappropriate to allow the fortuity of their failure to complete the felony to affect their
potential liability By calling the killing a murder, the state could impose the death
penalty Of course, those who did not kill during their unsuccessful felonies remained
eligible for no more than misdemeanor sanctions.
66. According to Fletcher, at an early time "malice" was not an affirmative basis for
murder but a means of expressing the conclusion that the conditions that would excuse a
defendant were absent. Up until the eighteenth century, the fact that a killing occurred
during an unlawful act was a "rejoinder" to a claim of accident. That claim-known as
per infortumum-was unavailable if the accident occurred during an unlawful act. Those
who chose to act unlawfully forfeited the excuse that would otherwise exculpate them from
responsibility for their homicides. See FLETCHER, supra note 10, § 4.4.1, at 276-79.
67 See id. at 278-82. There is a significant difference between the two "rules." In
the version that, according to Professor Fletcher, preceded Foster, participation in a felony
deprived a felon of the excuse of accident that was available to others whose homicides
would presumptively be considered murder. Id. at 277 The version that Foster
promulgated, however, held that the participation in a felony was a form of malice that
would turn a killing that was accidental into a murder. Id. at 281-82. While the former
was a "theory for rejecting excuse," the latter was "a formal test of liability." Id. at 278.
68. For additional explanations of the historical origins of the rule, see Crump &
Crump, supra note 8, at 360 n.7
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for the felony-murder rule are enshrouded, and destined to remain, in
mystery
I do not intend to take sides m the controversies over who is responsible
for felony-murder and why the rule was created. The point is simply that
it is not a rule with either solid, ancient ancestry or unmpeachably logical
underpinnings. To their complaints about the rule's inconsistency with
modem understandings of culpability and fault, critics add the charge that
its historical legitimacy is doubtful at best.69
It seems fairly clear that, in the eighteenth century, Blackstone intended
to approve of and endorse broad statements of the classic rule: a killing
committed during the course of a felony constitutes a murder.7' Viewed in
lustorical context, however, this rule was actually quite limited in both scope
and consequence. First, there were not many common-law felomes. 7'
Consequently, the occasions for invocation of the rule were limited. Second,
all common-law felomes were serious offenses that were inherently morally
69. See Fletcher, supra note 2, at 421 (felony-murder's historical foundations are
"tenuous and ill defined"); Grant & MacKay, supra note 9, at 133 (rule had "dubious
origins"); Lanham, supra note 7, at 91 (rule has "only the weakest of antecedents"); td. at
101 (felony-murder is not "relic of ancient barbarism but an instance of modem
monstrosity"); Sudduth, supra note 4, at 1306 (doctrine is of "questionable origin").
70. See FLETCHER, supra note 10, § 4.4.1, at 285 (maintaining that Foster was plainly
of view that any felonious intent would suffice for malice); PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note
17, at 62 (referring to Blackstone's stark statement of broad felony-murder rule); Barbre,
supra note 15, at 403 (asserting that Blackstone endorsed broad statement of felony-murder
rule). But see Lanham, supra note 7, at 99 (suggesting that ambiguities in Blackstone's
statement of felony-murder make it possible that he did not hold view that killing during
unlawful act was murder).
According to Foster, if a "death ensueth" from an act "done in the prosecution of a
felonious intention[,] it will be murder," but only if "the act from which death ensued was
malum in se" and not "if it was barely malum prohibitum." FOSTER, supra note 63, at 258-
59. Thus, his understanding of the doctrine does not seem to be quite as broad as some
think.
Blackstone stated that "if one intends to do another felony, and undesignedly kills a
man, this is also murder." BLACKSTONE, supra note 63, at *200-01.
71. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 3, at 623 (including consensual sodomy among
common-law felonies); Jo Anne C. Adlerstem, Felony-Murder in the New Criminal Codes,
4 AM. J. CRiM. L. 249 n.1 (1976) (noting that "homicide, mayhem, arson, rape, robbery,
burglary, larceny, prison breach, and rescue of a felon" were felonies at common law); see
also MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 commentary at 31 n.74 (1980) (observing that there were
few common-law felonies); JOHN C. KLOTTER, CRIMINAL LAW § 3.3, at 48 (2d ed. 1986)
(noting that there were few felonies when felony-murder rule originated); Walter Dickey et
al., The Inportance of Clarity in the Law of Homcide: The Wisconsin Revision, 1989 Wis.
L. REv 1323, 1365 (stating that there were relatively few common-law felonies).
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wrong,' and most of them engendered a fair degree of danger to human
life. 3 Finally, all felonies were pumshable by death.74 Therefore, the
felony-murder rule might make no difference in terms of the sanction
imposed.75 In sum, opportunities to employ the rule were restricted.
Moreover, the typical effect of the rule was to brand as murderers only those
who had performed seriously unmoral acts of a life-threatening nature, and
application of the rule might make no difference in punishment in an
individual case.
Because of the second qualification, the felony-murder rule was not dis-
sonant with notions of mens rea prevailing at the time of its origins. When
the rule first arrived on the scene, any wrongful mental attitude, any malev-
olence, could serve as the malice required for murder.76 One who engaged
m a felonious endeavor necessarily had a wicked mmdset. Such a person
often possessed some level of fault for the homicide caused as well.
These observations teach several lessons. First, no historical support
exists for the rule of law that results from transposing the classical, unquali-
72. In the words of the law, the common-law felonies were all mala in se-that is, in
society's eyes they were considered bad or immoral m themselves. These are to be
distinguished from felonies that are mala prohibita-that is, bad because they are prohibited
by law, not because of their inherent immorality
73. See LAFAvE & SCOTT, supra note 3, at 623 (concluding that with exceptions of
larceny and consensual sodomy, all common-law felonies involved danger to human life).
74. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 commentary at 31 n.74 (1980); LAFAVE &
ScoTr, supra note 3, at 622 n.4; TORCIA, supra note 7, at 212; Dickey et al., supra note
71, at 1365.
It is sometimes said that the fact that the sanction for any felony and the sanction for
murder were equivalent furnishes the "rationale" for the felony-murder rule. See Barbre,
supra note 15, at 403. It is difficult to see, however, how the fact that the offenses were
punishable by the same sanction provides a logical explanation for a rule that automatically
turns any killing during one felony into the distinct felony of murder. While the identical
nature of the available sanctions could mean that the rule did not have any real impact on
those subjected to it, it hardly provides an explanation of the rule's logic. The fact that a
felon was already eligible for the death penalty could just as easily, and perhaps more
rationally, have led to the conclusion that a conviction for the homicide was unnecessary
75. I say "might" make no difference because, according to Professor Fletcher, the
ultimate sanction was most likely to be carried out in connection with certain felonies,
including murder. Therefore, as a practical matter, a person convicted of murder might
well be treated more harshly than a person convicted, for example, of larceny See
FLETCHER, supra note 10, § 4.4.1, at 282-83.
76. See People v Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304, 319 (Mich. 1980) (early in common law




fled felony-murder rule onto the body of modem American criminal laws.
The designation "felony" does not have the same meaning that it had at com-
mon law I Today, there are numerous felomes, but not all are serious, or
mala in se, or life-endangering. 78 Moreover, the death penalty is restricted
to a precious few 71 The rest are pumshed less severely-most substantially
so.' To engraft the rule onto our contemporary scheme is to broaden the
rule dramatically, to change both its content and its consequences. 8 '
On the other hand, felony-murder rules that are restricted to certain,
serious, statutorily designated offenses or to inherently dangerous felomes
77 See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 438 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(stating that felony at common law and felony today bear only slight resemblance).
78. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 commentary at 31 (1980) (noting that today
there is wide range of felonies; many proscribe relatively minor conduct, many are not
dangerous to life); Dickey et al., supra note 71, at 1365 (observing that modem codes
include wide range of felonies many of which do not endanger life and most of which have
less severe penalties than murder); Barbre, supra note 15, at 406 n.6 (suggesting that many
statutory felonies have no natural tendency to cause death and are less serious than common-
law felonies); see, e.g., ALA. CODE § 11-65-40 (Supp. 1994) (making it felony to transmit
results of horse race within 20 minutes of completion); COLO. REV STAT. § 33-6-113 (1984
& Supp. 1993) (providing that it is felony to buy or sell eagles); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-10-
2(c) (Michle 1991) (making it felony for husband to abandon his pregnant wife and leave
state).
79. See PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 17, at 136 (observing that most modem felonies
are not capital).
80. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 commentary at 31 (1980) (stating that today
many crimes classified as felonies carry far less severe penalties than common-law felonies
did); see, e.g., ALA. CODE § 11-6540 (Supp. 1994) (punishing felony of tiransmitting racing
information by term of one to ten years and/or fine of $5,000 to $50,000); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 19-10-2(c) (Michie 1991) (punishing felony of abandoning pregnant wife and leaving state
by inprisonment for between one and three years); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-7(a) (Bums
1994) (punishing Class D felonies by fixed term of one and one-half years, with potential
for time added for aggravating circumstances or subtracted for mitigating circumstances, and
fine of up to $10,000).
81. The rule originally led to murder convictions for those who had chosen to engage
in seriously munmoral, usually life-endangering, conduct that resulted in a death. At least m
theory, it did not elevate the punishment beyond the level already available for the
underlying felony. When applied to the wide range of felonious activities that exist today,
the broad rule could lead to murder convictions for those who have engaged in relatively
minor, not seriously immoral, nondangerous conduct that happened to result in a death. The
punishment available for murder would likely be drastically higher than that available for
the underlying felony. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 commentary at 32 (1980) (opining
that "startling results" that would be consequence of applying felony-murder rule to
spectrum of modem felonies led to demands for limitation).
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can claim some historical support dating to at least the nineteenth century
Such rules may enhance punishment in a way that the original rule did not,
but m content they resemble their ancestor.82
In evaluating the historical support for the modem felony-murder rule,
one cannot ignore the marked evolution of how we conceptualize mens rea.
Modem scholarly and judicial thought considers fault for every element of
an offense to be an essential predicate for blame, responsibility, and
punishment.' As a result, unlike the early rule, all true variations of
contemporary felony-murder-even the most restricted versions-are
incompatible with the prevailing understanding of the fundamental mens rea
demand. The radical alteration of a basic aspect of the legal substructure
further weakens felony-murder's historical foundations and casts a very
different light on the doctrine.
The object of tis Part was to consider whether the felony-murder rule
has solid historical roots that can explain, even justify, its endurance despite
the basic inconsistency with modem mens rea notions. The rule's critics
would seem to be right. An unlimited modem rule has no antecedent in the
common law of England. Even limited versions of the rule can claim only
qualified historical support. Contrary to what might be the popular
impression, no version of felony-murder is grounded in centuries of
unblemished ancestry And yet the rule endures.
IV The Deterrence Delusion
The primary justification offered for the contemporary felony-murder
rule is deterrence.' The doctrine is allegedly designed to save lives by
82. Restricted rules resemble their ancestor because they do not extend the automatic
operation of the felony-murder rule beyond the sphere of a limited number of serious and/or
dangerous felonies. They do enhance the punishment available, however, because today the
sanction for murder is more severe than the sanction for most other felonies. If, as
Professor Fletcher suggests, the actual consequences of a murder conviction at common law
were more severe than the actual consequences of a conviction for another felony, see supra
note 75, then even the punishment enhancement feature of modem felony-murder schemes
would bear some resemblance to the original rule.
83. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
84. See Cole, supra note 8, at 98 (stating deterrence is most common defense offered
for felony-murder rule); see, e.g., People v Patterson, 778 P.2d 549, 558 (Cal. 1989)
(Lucas, C.J., concurring and dissenting) (asserting felony-murder rule performs valuable
function by deterring commission of inherently dangerous crimes); People v. Washington,
402 P.2d 130, 133 (Cal. 1965) (stating that purpose of felony-murder is to deter felons from
killing negligently or accidentally); Cole, supra note 8, at 87-92 (discussing deterrent
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threatemng potential killers with the serious sanction for first or second
degree murder.s One deterrent argument holds that the threat of a murder
conviction for any killing in furtherance of a felony, even an accidental
killing, might well induce a felon to forego committing the felony itself' 8
Because it could lead to quite severe punishment, the risk averse might shy
away from the entire felonious enterprise. Another argument, the more
prevalent of the two main deterrent explanations of felony-murder,'
maintains that the rule is aimed at discouraging certain conduct during the
felony, not the felony itself.88 The goal is to encourage greater care in the
performance of felonious acts. 9 Such care will lower the risks to human
life and result m fewer deaths. Still another view suggests that felons who
might kill intentionally in order to complete their felonies successfully will
be discouraged by the rule's proclamation that the law will entertain no
excuses for the homicide. Calculating felons will forego killing because of
their awareness that the chance of constructing a defense that would
eliminate or mitigate liability is virtually nonexistent and that, therefore,
their likely fate is a murder conviction. 90
operation of felony-murder rule).
85. See TORCIA, supra note 7, at 207 (maintaining that strict accountability approach
of felony-murder rule is attempt by law to protect innocent lives).
86. See Patterson, 778 P.2d at 558 (Lucas, C.J., concurring and dissenting) (arguing
that purpose of rule is to deter commission of inherently dangerous felonies); FLETCHER,
supra note O, § 4.4.5, at 298 (observing that one argument is that felony-murder rule was
designed to provide additional deterrent to felony); Cole, supra note 8, at 110 (stating that
felony-murder rule can deter potential felons from committing predicate offenses in first
place); Roth & Sundby, supra note 2, at 450-51 (observing that one strain of reasoning
holds that felony-murder doctrine is designed to deter felonies themselves).
87 See Roth & Sundby, supra note 2, at 450-51 n.28 (indicating that position that rule
is designed to deter underlying felony itself is "minority view").
88. See People v. Smith, 678 P.2d 886, 891-92 (Cal. 1984) (asserting that ostensible
purpose of rule is not to deter underlying felonies, but instead to deter negligent or
accidental killings occurring during commission of those felonies); FLETCHER, supra note
10, § 4.4.5, at 298 (opining that preferable and plausible rationale for felony-murder is
deterrence of killings, encouragement of care during felonies).
89. See TORCIA, supra note 7, at 207-08 (stating that purpose of law is to deter felons
from committing felonies in dangerous or violent ways); Cole, supra note 8, at 96 (asserting
that holding felons strictly liable for deaths during felonies plausibly deters by increasing
care on part of felons); Roth & Sundby, supra note 2, at 450-51 (suggesting that goal is to
induce cofelons to dissuade one another from using violence in perpetrating felony); Doyle,
supra note 18, at 196 (suggesting that goal of rule is to deter felons from engaging in
unnecessary violence that might kill).
90. See Cole, supra note 8, at 96 (asserting that felony-murder deters by eliminating
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Undoubtedly, one purpose of felony-murder was to prevent future
killings. That is true of every proscription of homicide. The history of the
felony-murder rule, however, does not provide the sort of deterrent focus
and emphasis that judges and scholars have found underlying the contempo-
rary rule.91 The writings of Coke, Foster, Blackstone, and others do not jus-
tify the doctrine on deterrence grounds.' It seems unlikely, at best, that the
originators of the rule would have explained its rationales m the same way
that modem courts and defenders do. At least no concrete evidence exists
that the original perspective was the same as the contemporary perspective.
That does not, of course, make the deterrent explanation for today's
versions erroneous or illogical. A rule that initially had one underlying
understanding and rationale could survive today on different premises.93 The
point is simply that the deterrent emphasis is a modem phenomenon.
It should not be surprising that this is so. The need to rationalize the
felony-murder rule in deterrent terms arises only because of the rule's con-
flict with accepted culpability principles. There must be adequate justifica-
tion to suspend the principles that mens rea is required for every element of
an offense and that malice is required for the result element of murder.94
possibility of false claims of lack of mens rea by those felony-murderers who do in fact kill
with actual, subjective culpability); Crump & Crump, supra note 8, at 371 (noting that by
"facilitating proof and simplifying liability [the rule] may deter intentional kill[ers]"
who are deprived of option of false claims). For a thorough discussion of possible ways m
which the felony-murder rule might operate as an effective deterrent, see generally Cole,
supra note 8.
91. But see KLOTTER, supra note 71, § 3.3, at 48 (asserting that felony-murder rule
was originally designed for purpose of protecting human life).
92. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
93. See Crump & Crump, supra note 8, at 396 (asserting that "many common law
doctrines originated] as artificial constructs [but] have proved to be supported by
policy").
94. Because the requirement of mens rea for each essential element was not considered
fundamental in earlier times, there was not the same need to find an adequate basis for
suspending the requirement in any given case. In Regina v Prince, 2 L.R.-Cr. Cas. Res.
154 (1875), for example, the defendant claimed that he could not be convicted of taking an
unmarried girl under 16 out of her father's possession because he reasonably and honestly
believed that she was 18 years of age. See id. at 156 (Brett, J.). In essence, his defense
was that he lacked mens rea for the age element. The majority's response was that he did
possess mens rea, in a more general sense, because he knowingly did an act that he knew
to be "wrong in itself'-takmg a young girl away from her father. See id. at 170
(Blackburn, J.). A guilty mind with respect to the age element was not considered essential.
See itd. at 171. Under that reasoning, the court did not need to find some counterweight to
justify the conviction of a defendant who clearly lacked such a guilty mmd.
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The protection of lives achieved through the enhanced deterrence that results
from the felony-murder doctrine is thought to provide that justification.
When the felony-murder rule arose, the premises widely accepted today
did not hold sway The doctrine was not considered a departure from
culpability norms, which were satisfied by the wrongfulness inherent in the
felonious intent. Thus, while the rule did discourage life-endangering
conduct, there was no necessity that it be sufficiently protective of human
life to counterbalance an infringement of fundamental principles.
The use of strict liability-or lesser culpability than is the norm-as a
means of preventing harm by maxinizing deterrence and minmizmg the
possibilities of escaping liability is certainly not unknown in our modem
criminal law I The growth of strict liability criminality has been a
significant modem phenomenon.' Lawmakers and other proponents of strict
criminal liability believe that in a variety of ways strict liability can increase
deterrence of behaviors that bring about particular social harms. As a result,
these social harms are diminished.
People v. Olsen, 685 P.2d 52 (Cal. 1984), stands in pointed contrast. Therein, the
defendant asserted that his reasonable and honest mistake that a girl was over 16 should have
been a defense to the crime of lewd and lascivious acts with a child under 14. Id. at 54.
The court's reply, in essence, was that the legislature had intended the offense to be strict
liability on the age element in order to maximize protection of children of tender years. Id.
at 58-59. Unlike the Pnnce court, the Olsen court accepted the basic notion that mens rea
is generally required for each essential element. The Olsen court found the offense at issue
to be a deliberate exception to that general rule, an exception based on. a legislative
balancing of countervailing interests.
95. See, e.g., United States v Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 253-54 (1922) (holding that to
protect innocent purchasers from danger, statute prohibiting possession of and trafficking
in narcotics did not require proof defendant knew substances were narcotics); United States
v. Ayo-Gonzalez, 536 F.2d 652, 660, 662 (5th Cir. 1976) (holding that 16 U.S.C. § 1081,
which prohibits fishing in certain U.S. waters, was intended by Congress to dispense with
proof of mens rea in order to protect marine resources against depletion or extinction and
to ensure effective and strict enforcement of law), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1072 (1977);
Olsen, 685 P.2d at 59 (holding that in order to protect children of tender years against
sexual exploitation, legislature intended lewd and lascivious acts with child under 14 to be
strict liability offense).
96. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 253 (1952) (discussing "century-old
but accelerating tendency" to create strict liability offenses); Francis B. Sayre, Public
Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. Rv 55, 55 (1933) (asserting that "we are witnessing
today a steadily growing stream of offenses punishable without any criminal intent
whatsoever"); Richard A. Wasserstrom, Strict Liability in the Criminal Law, 12 STAN. L.
REV 731, 731 n.1 (1960) (noting that proliferation of legislatively created strict liability
offenses is "of quite recent date").
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First, strict liability can induce those who engage in the enterprises that
engender the harms to exercise maximum care-even more than a
reasonable person would-because they know that only prevention of the
proscribed act or consequence can preclude liability 7 Second, some who
fear they will not be able to avoid liability may refrain entirely from
engaging in a risky enterprise.98 As a result, they will not create the
occasions that bring about the social harm. Third, because many people
engage in the enterprises that cause the harm, the availability of a "no mens
rea" defense could clog the system and lead to lengthy delays in prosecu-
tion. The threat of a sanction, and thus the deterrent force of the law,
could diminish. By eliminating the option of a no mens rea claim and by
making the proof required for conviction simple, a higher volume of
prosecutions can be handled, and the threat of prosecution and conviction
can remain meaningful." Fourth, strict liability deprives defendants who
cause harm culpably (that is, with negligence or a higher degree of fault)
of the opportunity to deceivejuries."°° Thus, the incentive to do wrong and
escape under cover of false testimony is lessened, and deterrence is further
enhanced.
The modem employment of strict liability is typically reserved for
offenses of a "public welfare" or "regulatory" nature.'0 1 There are two
97 See Regina v City of Sault Ste. Marie, 85 D.L.R.3d 161, 171 (1978) (reciting
argument that "removal of any possible loophole [is] an incentive to take" extra care
"in order that mistakes and mishaps be avoided"); Wasserstrom, supra note 96, at 736
(contending that it is plausible that person subjected to strict liability might be induced to
engage in activities "with much greater caution").
98. See Wasserstrom, supra note 96, at 737 (opining that it is reasonable to believe
that strict liability offenses might have "the added effect of keeping a relatively large class
of persons from engaging in certain" activities).
99. See City of Sault Ste. Mane, 85 D.L.R.3d at 162 (describing "administrative
efficiency" argument in favor of strict liability).
100. See Malcolm Budd & Andrian Lynch, Voluntariness, Causation, and Strict
Liability, 1978 CRIM. L. Rv 74, 76 n.6 (observing that claim is made that strict liability
prevents those with fault who would "take advantage of some false but successful plea of
lack of fault from doing so and thereby escaping liability").
101. "Public welfare" or "regulatory" offenses ordinarily do not proscribe conduct that
is immanently immoral. They seek to regulate certain activities that by their very nature
pose widespread risks of harm to the public. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246,
255-56 (1952); Sayre, supra note 96, at 68, 79. In contrast stand the offenses known to the
common law, offenses that coincide with and are designed to reflect society's morals.
Modem strict liability legislation is not confined exclusively to public welfare crimes.
As at common law, in the vast majority of jurisdictions statutory rape remains a strict
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simple reasons for that limitation. First, strict liability-criminal responsi-
bility without proof of moral fault-is thought acceptable only in cases in
which the moral stigma is minor or limited and the sanction is not severe. 102
Suspension of the fundamental principle that conviction and punishment are
justifiable only when imposed on the morally blameworthy is not defensible
unless the "imposition" on the individual is not great. Our respect for
individuals and our sense of fair treatment leads us to eschew severe
punishments and stigmata in the absence of proven moral fault."13
Second, public welfare offenses generally address conduct that
threatens a high volume of widespread harm to society 11 A high volume
of prosecutions, or at least the threat thereof, is critical for achieving the
liability offense on the element of the age of the victim. See People v Olsen, 685 P.2d 52,
54 n.10 (Cal. 1984). And in jurisdictions where it has not been abolished or modified,
misdemeanor-manslaughter, like felony-murder, requires no culpability to be proven for the
element of causing death. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 commentary at 77 (1980).
102. See Sayre, supra note 96, at 78-80 (opining that strict liability is only defensible
when penalty and moral obloquy are limited); see also State v Turner, 474 P.2d 91, 94
(Wash. 1970) (concluding that although state may crimmalize acts without regard to intent
or knowledge, "guilty knowledge will be deemed an essential ingredient if the defined
crimes involve moral turpitude"); LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF CANADA, STUDIES IN
STRICT LIABILITY 15-16 (1974) (concluding that strict liability is both illogical and unjust
for "real crimes" that involve condemnation of those who have done something wrongful
and deserving of punishment).
103. See LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF CANADA, supra note 102, at 18-19 (suggesting
that inclusion of mens rea requirement for real crimes regards accused individuals as
"person[s] with person[s'] rights and duties, responsibilities and obligations" and that
elimination of mens rea for such crimes would result in "loss of liberty" and rests upon
"inhuman attitude"); Peter Arenella, Convicting the Morally Blameless: Reassessing the
Relationship Between Legal and MoralAccountability, 39 UCLA L. REv 1511, 1513 (1992)
(stating that criminal law ties legal blame to moral blame for serious, severely punished
offenses and that to convict for mala in se crime, State must prove "moral culpability for
breaching the law's commands" (emphasis in original)); Sayre, supra note 96, at 56
(asserting that infliction of "substantial punishment upon one who is morally entirely
innocent would outrage the feelings of the community"); id. at 80 n.88 (calling it
.grossly unfatir to subject" those without mens rea to "the social disgrace of conviction" or
risk of substantial penalty); id. at 84 (maintaining that it "would sap the vitality of the
criminal law" if strict liability doctrines applicable to public welfare offenses were extended
to "true crimes").
104. See Morssette, 342 U.S. at 254 (discussing how widespread risks and perils
engendered by industrial revolution and growth of congested cities gave rise to phenomenon
of strict liability public welfare offenses); Sayre, supra note 96, at 79 (concluding that strict
criminal liability is justifiable "[i]f violation threatens serious and widespread public
injury").
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preventive goals of the proscriptions. Strict liability is essential to maxi-
mizmg the number of prosecutions and, thus, to achueving the very objects
of the criminal prohibitions. 5
In sum, in the regulatory context, the gains to society are thought
great, and the costs to the individual are considered tolerable. These two
conditions make strict liability an important and acceptable tool." 6 Both
are essential to the balance that sustains modem strict liability legislation.
The deterrent reasoning underlying felony-murder tracks most of the
reasomng underlying strict liability generally Supporters claim that
felony-murder induces felons to exercise maximum care during felonies,
prompts potential felons to refrain from committing felomes in the first
place, and warns prospective felons that they will not be able to hide
behind false claims of accident or mere negligence."W The problem,
however, is that felony-murder does not fit the mold of crimes for which
strict liability is considered appropriate and necessary It is not a modem
public welfare offense, but a mala in se common-law crime. The stigma
could hardly be worse;"°s the penalty could not be much higher. 119 More-
105. See Sayre, supra note 96, at 69-70 (concluding that number of petty "public
welfare" prosecutions that swamp courts precludes inquiries into intent and that "ready
enforcement which is vital for effective petty regulation on an extended scale can be gamed
only by a total disregard of the state of mind").
106. Not all agree that strict liability crimes are a wise or legitimate use of the state's
coercive power. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.05 commentary at 282-83 (1985);
Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Crmal Law, 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 422-
25 (1958).
107 For a discussion of deterrence and felony-murder, see supra text accompanying
notes 84-90. Understandably, supporters of strict felony-murder liability do not assert that
without it, logjams would occur or that a mens rea requirement would clog the system and
lead felons to believe that they could kill and never be brought to trial. The "volume" of
felony-murder prosecutions does not rival the volume of prosecutions for regulatory
offenses.
108. The convicted felony-murderer is branded at least a second degree and often a first
degree murderer.
109. In some circumstances in certain jurisdictions, the death penalty is an available
sanction. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-2(c) (1994) (providing possible death penalty for
felony-murder committed under aggravated circumstances); ARIZ. REV STAT. ANN. § 13-
1105(c) (Supp. 1993) (proViiding death penalty for felony-murder); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-
101(c) (Michie 1993) (prescribing death penalty for capital felony-murder); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 53a-54b (West Supp. 1994) (listing death penalty for certain dangerous
felonies); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04(3) (West Supp. 1994) (making death penalty available
for first degree felony-murderers).
Even if death is not available, the sanction provided for first or second degree murder
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over, there is no avalanche of felony killings. Strict liability is not essen-
tial to combat a widespread societal threat. Consequently, felony-murder
does not fit the modem strict liability paradigm. Because the rule appears
to infringe substantially upon accepted culpability principles without
providing offsetting societal gains of sufficient magmtude,"' neither of the
conditions that we properly consider essential to the acceptance of strict
criminal liability exists. The balance that usually underlies and is thought
to justify strict criminal liability is simply not struck m the felony-murder
context.'"'
Felony-murder stands apart from the body of public welfare crimes
in another significant respect. Public welfare crimes do not ordinarily
constitute alternative versions of an offense that otherwise requires mens
rea. From their conception, they are strict liability crimes that do not
require mens rea because that is their essence. The omission of the
culpability element is inseparably linked to the reasons for their creation.
Felony-murder, on the other hand, is a variety of murder, a stigmatizing
common-law crime the essence of which is actual malice. Felony-murder
is the no or lesser culpability branch of an offense that otherwise depends
upon proof of serious subjective culpability 112 In that sense, it is some-
will certainly be among the highest penalties provided for any offense. See, e.g., ALA.
CODE § 13A-6-2(c) (1994) (listing life imprisonment without parole as possible penalty for
felony-murder); ARiz. REV STAT. ANN. § 13-1105(c) (Supp. 1993) (providing for life
imprisonment for some felony-murderers); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-102(2) (1993)
(providing for punishment by death, by life imprisonment, or by imprisonment for not less
than 10 nor more than 100 years).
110. I do not mean to minimize the importance of even one human life. My point is
that the cumulative gains in terms of protecting human life do not seem to outweigh the
cumulative losses incurred by punishment of those without fault.
111. Cf. Roth & Sundby, supra note 2, at 491 (concluding that felony-murder
transgresses principle that nonregulatory offenses must have culpability proven for every
essential element).
112. Oliver Wendell Holmes was of the view that murder did not require proof that the
defendant was actually aware of the risk to human life, as long as the act was sufficiently
dangerous and a reasonable person would have been aware of the danger. See OLIVER W
HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 53-60 (1881). He believed that one could be branded a
murderer on the basis of sufficiently extreme negligence. See Commonwealth v Pierce,
138 Mass. 165, 174-76 (1884). The predominant view, however, is that murder requires
the serious fault that can be found only in subjective awareness and disregard of a sufficient
risk to human life. See People v Patterson, 778 P.2d 549, 557 (Cal. 1989) (stating that
"mental component" required for proof of "implied malice" is both knowledge by defendant
that his conduct endangers life and conscious disregard for life).
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what unique and most unlike the range of strict liability offenses recently
incorporated into the criminal law 113
The problem with the modem felony-murder doctrine is not only that
it seeks practical goals by prescribing severe punishments without proof of
fault, but that it does so on the basis of unproven and highly questionable
assumptions. While the felony-murder rule must save some lives, the odds
are that the number is small indeed. The number of killings during felomes
is relatively low 14 The subset of such killings that are nonculpable-thus
not already subject to the threat of a substantial sanction-is undoubtedly
considerably smaller. Further, the addition of a small risk of a murder
sanction for an unlikely event is probably not a major influence on some
prospective felons' behavior,15 and a good number of those who are
affected in some way probably would not have killed in any event.
Moreover, some who are aware of and even sensitive to the threatened
sanction will probably still kill negligently or accidentally 16
Admittedly, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to prove that the
felony-murder rule does not annually save a considerable number of lives.
Nonetheless, in a world in which the evidence is uncertain (or nonexistent)
113. Felony-murder does not stand alone as a serious common-law strict liability
offense. See HERBERT PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 125-26 (1968).
Statutory rape is another prime example that has survived. See id. at 126; supra notes 94-
95. Strict liability bigamy has not fared as well, but has not yet been eliminated. See
KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 6, at 301; PACKER, supra, at 126. Although it has been
abolished by some states and severely restricted by others, misdemeanor-manslaughter also
remains m force to varying degrees m various jurisdictions. See id. at 126-27
These survivors share with felony-murder a tension with contemporary conceptions
of culpability and other characteristics that set them far apart from the run of "modem"
strict liability offenses. To appreciate the difference, contrast murder, rape, bigamy, and
manslaughter with the strict liability offenses collected in the commentary to § 2.05 of the
Model Penal Code. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.05 commentary at 284-90 & n.7 (1985).
114. See LAFAVE & SCOrT, supra note 3, at 640; Schulhofer, supra note 52, at 1542-
43; Sudduth, supra note 4, at 1307; see also Roth & Sundby, supra note 2, at 451-52.
115. See Schulhofer, supra note 52, at 1546 (asserting that it is not easy to determine
extent to which relatively severe penalty imposed on relatively infrequent basis can have
meaningful deterrent effect, but that certainty of sanction seems more important than
severity). Only those who are both risk averse and responsive to the differential between
the penalty for the felony and the penalty for murder would be influenced.
116. Only if a felon is deterred from engaging m the felony itself would all risk of a
killing during the offense be eliminated. If the felony-murder rule's deterrent effect is the
encouragement of greater care in the commission of the felony, as is usually posited, see
supra text accompanying notes 88-89, then some deaths will undoubtedly still occur. No
matter how careful felons try to be, they cannot prevent all accidents.
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and in which it seems unlikely that felons actually hear the rule's deterrent
message in the ways that courts presume that they do, common sense would
suggest putting the burden of proof upon those who contend that deterrent
gains are sufficient to outweigh the infringement of our fundamental
philosophy of fault and punishment. 
117
One might contend that the suspicions about the efficacy of deterrence
prove too much-that similar doubts about deterrent gains could be raised
in all areas of criminal law This argument misses the point. In most other
areas there is no need to prove a countervailing deterrent gain because the
culpability principle is not violated. Either culpability proportionate to
liability is a part of the requisite proof, or the sanction is sufficiently small
to be acceptable despite the absence of proven fault. Neither is true in the
case of felony-murder. Proof of the level of culpability that ordinarily
justifies a murder sanction is not required, and the available sanction is very
severe.
I refer to the claim that the felony-murder rule actually results in
substantial savings of human life-savings so substantial as to justify its
infidelity to the conception of fault we usually hold dear-as the "deterrence
delusion." Assertions that the doctrine exists to prevent killings that occur
in the course of felonies and that it actually achieves its goal are rooted in
blind faith or self-delusion. More should be required. If the rule is to
stand upon deterrent premises, it is incumbent upon supporters to do more
than speculate. They should have to justify the suspension of our normal
insistence upon proof of blameworthiness. Without a credible foundation
in established facts, deterrence is not a real justification, but is instead a
poor excuse for our infidelity 118 We owe ourselves more honesty
It is unclear whether the public and lawmakers actually believe the
delusion or, instead, are aware of the spurious nature of the deterrent claim
but, nonetheless, are content to rely upon it. There are probably members
in each camp. What is clear is that while the delusion is the beginning of
117 Of course, reasonable people can differ about the conclusions to be drawn from
"common sense." See Crump & Crump, supra note 8, at 396-97 (concluding that even
though deterrent theory behind felony-murder may not be fully capable of empirical
evaluation, its value is "logically inferable"). The main reason that supporters of the rule
should bear the burden of proof is that they are the ones who advocate departure from a
basic principle.
118. For criticisms of the deterrent efficacy of the felony-murder rule, see Fletcher,
supra note 2, at 428; Schulhofer, supra note 52, at 1542-43; Seibold, supra note 9, at 151-
52. For deterrent-based defenses of the doctrine, see Cole, supra note 8, at 78-119; Crump
& Crump, supra note 8, at 369-71.
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an explanation for felony-murder's survival, it is only the beginmig. To
get to the bottom of the felony-murder rule, it is necessary to explore the
reasons that we would indulge such a delusion. On such an important
matter, why have we been willing to rest on assumptions and not demand
proof that the rule actually produces beneficial results? Why do we
continue to sacrifice a fundamental principle on no more than unfounded
faith in the deterrent efficacy of a doctrine with dubious parentage? Only
forthright confrontation of these questions can bring us closer to under-
standing the felony-murder rule's remarkable persistence.
V Reasons Felony-Murder Remains
It seems likely that a number of forces have conspired to preserve the
felony-murder rule and to keep it safe against an unceasing barrage of
criticism. In all probability, none of them would have been independently
adequate to sustain the doctrine. Their confluence has undoubtedly been
critical to the rule's endurance. The following reflections upoAi those forces
are not intended as gospel, but rather as food for thought.
A. Histoncal Roots
Earlier, I documented the vulnerability of the historical underpinnings
of felony-murder."' In light of that, it might seem odd to posit "history"
as one of the forces that have nurtured the rule. It may be odd, but it is
neither inconsistent nor contradictory to do so. As I see it, the historical
impetus of the doctrine simply cannot be ignored.
The birth of the felony-murder doctrine mght well have been a
rmstake or an accident. It most certainly is not attributable to considered
reflection and thoughtful policy analysis. Nonetheless, the fact remains that
it was born into the law and, more important, was adopted by American
legal systems. It was given a place among our laws at a relatively early
date' 2 and has been with us for most, if not all, of our nation's history
In this country, felony-murder's historical credentials seem solid.
It would be foolish to suggest that every historical relic descended to
us from the English common law had to survive.12 1 Proof to the contrary
119. See supra notes 53-76 and accompanying text.
120. See FLETCHER, supra note 10, § 4.4.1, at 283 (noting that Blackstone and East
picked up Foster's felony-murder doctrine and bequeathed it to American state legislatures,
which incorporated it into nineteenth century penal codes); Lanham, supra note 7, at 90 n.3
(noting that American cases in 18308 treated felony-murder doctrine as both well-established
and legitimate).
121. Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote:
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would not be hard to come by The point is that strong roots m American
legal history provide a rule with at least a cloak of respectability, an aura
of the wisdom that comes with age. Longevity alone is not an adequate
reason to retain a rule of law Historical credentials, however, provide
more than enough reason to hesitate and to reflect upon the prospect of
abandonment.
In addition, time gives rise to a certain amount of inertia that prevents
us from casually forsaking the past. The longer the ancestry, the greater
the inertia. Historical attachments are severable, but a decent amount of
respect and an understandable degree of caution require us to have good
reasons before we sever them.
The longer we live with a doctrine-and felony-murder has been a
compamon for more than 150 years-the more familiar it becomes. And,
if I may corrupt a phrase, familiarity can breed content. Felony-murder has
been so much a part of our law for so long that the very thought of
abrogation is discomforting. It does not matter that England, the country
m which it originated and developed, abolished the doctrine over turty-five
years ago." By the time of that event, the rule had become an integral and
independent part of our heritage and a functioning part of our legal
landscape. It is hardly surprising that American states felt no obligation to
follow suit."z
I have tried to imagine a world without a felony-murder rule.
Assuming that it had never arisen, I have wondered whether it would be
adopted as part of our law if proposed for the first time today Although
I am not without doubts, my inclination is to answer in the negative. In
fact, I doubt that anyone would actually propose such a rule today 124 I can
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid
down m the time of Henry IV It is still more revolting if the grounds upon
which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists
from blind imitation of the past.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV L. REV 457, 469 (1897).
122. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
123. A few American jurisdictions have abolished felony-murder entirely See supra
note 19 and accompanying text. While the British abandonment has been mentioned as a
relevant factor, see People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304, 312 (M~fich. 1980), there is no reason
to think that any of the American jurisdictions simply followed the leader. The British
decision to overthrow the doctrine seems to have had a negligible effect on our laws.
124. Perhaps I should be less confident. Some pretty odd proposals are made and even
make their way into our criminal laws. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.42
(West 1991) (crmnalizmg advertisements of intoxicating liquors that contain references to
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easily imagme a proposal to enhance punishment for a felony when one
precipitates a death during the commission. What I find unlikely is that
anyone would suggest that a killing during a felony (even a felony inherently
dangerous to human life) ought to be considered a coequal with the
variations of "actual malice" murders. In a system never inured to felony-
murder, it would seem a bit bizarre; it would be a rule without a modem
analogue.
We will, of course, never know whether I am right or wrong. Because
of lustory, we can only imagine such a legal world. And therein lies my
point. Because felony-murder has a time-honored place, it is considerably
more difficult for us to think of a body of criminal laws without it." The
winds of change have faced and continue to face a challenge made all the
more daunting by the psychological attachments of history Old habits die
much harder than new ones.
B. The Politics of Law and Order and of Life and Death
The arguments against the felony-murder rule are rational, principled,
and sensible. The doctrine is undeniably and unavoidably inconsistent with
modern notions of culpability "2 Moreover, the deterrent justifications
offered to assuage concerns about pumshment without fault are logically
questionable and empirically unsupported. 127 These abolitionist arguments,
deceased ex-presidents of United States); id. § 750.337 (providing that anyone who uses
"indecent, immoral, obscene, vulgar or insulting language in the presence or hearing of any
woman or child" commits misdemeanor); id. § 750.542 (crimmalizing playing national
anthem in public places in certain ways-such as, as part of medley or as exit march). Still,
it seems fair to say that nothing that in form or substance resembles felony-murder has made
its way into our criminal law in modem times.
125. History most likely played a role in the decision of the Model Penal Code (MPC)
drafters to make their murder provision palatable by incorporating a "presumption" of
culpability when a killing occurs in the course of certain felonies. See MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 210.2(l)(b) (1980). The presumption is actually a permissive inference that jurors may,
but need not, make. See id. § 1.12(5)(b). Because culpability for murder must be found
beyond a reasonable doubt, see id., the MPC provision is the next thing to abolition of the
felony-murder rule. Nevertheless, the awareness of our historical attachment to felony-
murder kept the drafters from biting the bullet and eliminating all traces of the rule from
the MPC. That historical attachment has also undoubtedly influenced the decisions of
American states to eschew the route proposed by the MPC. See KADISH & SCHULHOFER,
supra note 6, at 514 (noting that only New Hampshire has adopted MPC formulation of
felony-murder).
126. See supra text accompanying notes 35-37
127 See supra text accompanying notes 86-90.
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however, must contend with a couple of strong currents in American
criminal law, currents that have been flowing for some time, that show no
signs of weakening, and that are irresistible to lawmakers and appealing to
their constituents.
The demand for "law and order" strikes an emotional chord in America.
One can hardly be elected to public office without embracing the concept
wholeheartedly In 1992, the Democrats took that lesson seriously and
gamed the White House. In the 1994 campaigns, virtually every candidate
for a major office claimed that he or she would be tougher on criminals than
his or her opponent. The phrase is a shorthand, a code for a number of
related ideas. We are a society that sees itself as being plagued by an ever-
increasing epidemic of serious crime."2 We lead the world in homicides, for
example. 129  We seem to have an "us against them" attitude, a siege
mentality, a sense that we are locked in a mortal struggle with the
enemy-crimals. This embattled posture leads us to prefer tough, punitive
approaches to dealing with criminals and issues of criminal law We are
inclined to restrict the rights of accused and suspected individuals, 3 to
128. See America's Bulging Prisons, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 24, 1991, at 20
(observing that United States leads world in imprisonment rates due to "crime explosion"
m 1980s) [hereinafter Bulging Prisons]; Andrew Mollison, U.S. Crime Rate Falls at Last,
ATLANTA CONST., Apr. 26, 1993, at A2 (observing that U.S. crime rate dropped in 1992
for first time since 1984); Norval Morris, It's the Time, Not the Rate of Crime, That's
Filling American Prisons, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 29, 1993, § 1, at 11 (noting that popular and
political perspective is that crime increases year by year and demands tough responses and
that conventional wisdom assumes that increased prison population is due to "soaring crime
rates"); Jennifer Nagorka, Fear of Crime Up, but Murder Rate in U.S. Same as in '74,
DALLAS MORNING NEws, Mar. 29, 1993, at 6A (stating that "[c]rime-and the fear of
it-permeates Americans' lives like the stench in a sewer" and quoting opinion that public
generally tends to think that crime problem is always worsening).
129. See David Ellis, The Deadliest Year Yet, TIME, Jan. 13, 1992, at 18 (observing
that United States reached new high in number of homicides in 1991 and that it leads
Western Hemisphere in homicides); Mollison, supra note 128, at A2 (noting that "[n]o other
industrialized country even comes close to" United States in homicides); Morris, supra note
128, at 11 (stating that United States is far ahead of other countries in homicides); Nagorka,
supra note 128, at 6A (documenting homicide rate in United States and contrasting it with
much lower rates in other countries).
130. Examples of this "inclination" are proposals to expand the exceptions to the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule, to limit the review available to convicted defendants, and to
eliminate pretrial rights recognized by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., OFFICE OF LEGAL
POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, TRUTH IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERIES, REPORT No. 7,
REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ON FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS REVIEw OF STATE
JUDGMENTS at v-vii, 53-71 (1988), repnnted in 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF 901, 908-09, 966-85
(1989) (discussing desirability of restricting availability of federal habeas relief); OFFICE OF
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increase the severity of sentences,13 1 and to expand the availability of the
death penalty.132 Law and order means that we will use force to wm the war
against crime and that we will equip ourselves with more powerful weapons
designed to bring crime under control.
Of course, this punitive, forceful approach is not the only alternative for
dealing with and trying to control our crisis of violent crime. Some think
that a preferable solution is to devote more resources to eliminating the
causes. They would prefer, from both practical and philosophical stand-
points, to try to remedy poverty, inadequate living conditions, ineffective
educational systems, deficient health care, and the spectrum of underlying
variables that they believe engender crime."' In their view, we are respons-
LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, TRUTH IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERIES, REPORT No.
3, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ON THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL
UNDER THE MASsL4H LINE OF CASES at iv-vi, 27-37 (1986), reprinted in 22 U. MICH. J.L.
REF 661, 666-68, 696-706 (1989) (advocating abrogation of right to counsel against pretrial
elicitation of inculpatory statements from accused individuals); OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, TRUTH IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERIES, REPORT No. 2, REPORT TO
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ON THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE EXCLUSIONARY RULE at vi-vii, 46-
53 (1986), reprinted in 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF 573, 580-82, 631-38 (1989) (proposing and
discussing abolition of or restrictions upon Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule); Frank J.
Remington, Change in the Availability of Federal Habeas Corpus: Its Significance for State
Prisoners and State Correctional Programs, 85 MICH. L. REv 570, 574, 578 (1986)
(discussing Supreme Court's restrictions of and Congress's proposals to restrict federal
habeas corpus remedy).
131. See Bulging Prisons, supra note 128, at 20 (stating that new study found "that the
United States leads the world in per-capita incarceration of criminals"); Morris, supra note
128, at 11 (observing that during 1980s, "political attitudes and sentencing laws and policies
toughened"); Rob Rossi, Clinton Supporters Take on Barr's Rx for Crime, THE
RECORDER, Sept. 30, 1992, at 3.(stating that Bush Administration took position that states
ought to adopt federal government's tougher sentencing and imprisonment standards as way
of dealing with violent crime); Towards Honest Sentencing, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 27, 1993,
at 10 (noting calls of Massachusetts Governor and others for "truth in sentencing" bills and
suggesting that such bills "play[ ] well to a frustrated public") [hereinafter Honest
Sentencing].
132. See, e.g., Honest Sentencing, supra note 131, at 10 (noting that Massachusetts
Governor's proposed bill to deal with crime includes "death penalty provision"); Mary Beth
Lane & Thomas Suddes, The Siege Ends, PLAIN DEALER, Apr. 22, 1993, at IA (noting call
for re-examination and toughening of Ohio's death penalty law in wake of fatal prison riot).
133. See Bulging Prisons, supra note 128, at 20 (urging that "the nation's greatest
exertions in the crimial-justice arena should be to eliminate the conditions that cause crime,
especially in the inner cities, and to nip crime in the bud through early intervention
programs"); Matthew T. Crosson, Retirmg Court Admnistrator Offers Reflections About the
Justice System, N.Y L.J., May 3, 1993, at 53, S6 (observing that "[s]ome argue that we
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ible for the conditions that have given rise to the plague. Force has proven
ineffective in dealing with it. The only sensible way to combat crime is with
creativity, resources, and compassion directed at the root causes.
Given a choice between these antithetical attitudes, our society clearly
prefers the punitive, forceful approach. 134 We pay some attention to the
underlying causes of crime, but proposals and efforts to bring it under
control center primarily around force and coercion. Despite some periods
during which we have inclined a bit more toward "prevention-oriented"
reform, the law and order attitude has generally prevailed. 135 It is clearly the
controlling popular attitude in our society today
The felony-murder rule is compatible with the law and order mental-
ity "I It is harsh, tough, and designed to protect us against those who
introduce unwarranted and unnecessary threats of death into our daily lives.
It is meant to safeguard us against the risks of armed robbery, burglary,
rape, and the like by sending an unmistakably stern and punitive message to
felons. The abolition of felony-murder, on the other hand, is inconsistent
with the law and order current. Consequently, anyone bent on reforming the
rule must fight the tide and be prepared to pay a political price.' In the
world of American politics, logical consistency and fairness to felons are not
very potent weapons against the charge that one is soft on crime and hostile
to law and order. In part, felony-murder's continued survival must be rooted
in the politics of law and order. 3
will make no progress m reducing crime until the family structure is re-established, poverty
is eliminated, and decent-paying jobs are available for everyone").
134. The dichotomy is, of course, an oversimplification. On the spectrum of attitudes,
there are more than just the two extreme alternatives. See Ronald J. Ostrow, FBI May Shift
Resources to Domestic Crime, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1991, at Al, A16 (noting Attorney
General Barr's suggestions that both toughened law enforcement and social programs
designed to eliminate root causes of crime are essential in fighting crime and that argument
between two is "false dichotomy"). The point is simply that our strong, general inclination
is toward the "crime control" end of the spectrum.
135. Cf. id. (describing "'weed and seed' approach," which first employs tougher crime
control measures to "weed out" crime and disorder "before [seeding] social reform").
136. See FLETCHER, supra note 10, § 4.4.7, at 318 (stating that felony-murder rule is
too attractive to law enforcement to be easily surrendered); Fletcher, supra note 2, at 417-18
(observing that law enforcement's efforts on behalf of felony-murder should not surprise us
and that it would be naive to expect otherwise).
137 See Seibold, supra note 9, at 161 (concluding that legislative reluctance to abolish
felony-murder is understandable because taking that position could suggest softness on crime
and be tantamount to political suicide).
138. See Doyle, supra note 18, at 236 (asserting that legislators are hesitant to eliminate
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The significance of "life and death" issues gives rise to a second
current m our culture that has probably contributed to the retention of
felony-murder. When life and death are at stake, emotions run ugh and
controversy abounds. One need look no further than the furors that
surround our national debates over abortion, assisted suicide, and capital
punishment. Life, particularly the life of an innocent, has particularly
evocative symbolic value and political force.13 9
In the case of felony-murder, a felon's interest m fair, proportional
treatment stands in stark contrast to the life of an innocent victim. The
decision to favor the latter may not be rationally consistent with culpability
premises and may not be empirically supportable in deterrent terms, but it
is emotionally compelling. Innocent victims merit our support, our
protection, and, when their lives are lost, our affirmation of their value.
Denunciation of the killer-who is, after all, a felon-is a way of proclaim-
ing the significance of innocent human life."4
A call for the abolition of felony-murder flies m the face of the
importance that we accord such life. The repeal of a rule that announces
how very valuable actual and potential victims' lives are could send a
message that undercuts our commitment. 4 For this reason as well, to seek
the end of felony-murder is to invite the end of political viability 142
One possible explanation for the judicial reluctance to abolish felony-
murder when the power to do so exists 43 is that judges are acutely aware
felony-murder because they fear political pressures and appearance that they are soft on
crime); Seibold, supra note 9, at 136 (observing that reluctance to abolish doctrine is due
to "social and political pressures" rather than to flawed logic on part of critics).
139. Cf. FLETCHER, supra note 10, § 5.3.1, at 380 (noting that human life is commonly
thought to be sacred, and, thus, homicide invades sacred realm and constitutes "desecration").
140. See Crump & Crump, supra note 8, at 367-68 (opining that felony-murder rule
serves goal of condemnation, which includes reinforcement of value of reverence for human
life); Rambo, supra note 9, at 704 (suggesting that application of felony-murder rule to
narcotics suppliers advances no principle but "vindication of user's death").
141. See Crump & Crump, supra note 8, at 368 (noting that if law did not treat felony-
homicide more severely than it treats mere felony, message could be "a devaluation of
human life," and suggesting that by condemning one who kills in course of felony, law
expresses "solidarity with the victim[ ]" while failure to do so could "communicate to the
victim that we do not understand his suffering").
142. Unlike Professor Fletcher, therefore, I am not the least bit surprised that
legislatures and courts have not sought to make the rule conform to our "well-accepted
criteria of individual accountability and proportionate punishment." See Fletcher, supra note
2, at 417-18. Strong counterweights counsel against such a move.
143. Putting aside the question of unconstitutionality, a court has the power to abolish
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of the political ramifications. If they serve subject to the approval of
voters, electoral pressures could induce jurists to retain felony-murder.
Even if they are not subject to the electorate's will, judges might well
realize that abolition could provoke an even harsher regime. If they abolish
the limited forms of the rule that have endured, legislators might react by
enacting even broader rules. Those hostile to the rule nught consider it the
better part of valor to swallow a theoretically indefensible and empirically
unsupported felony-murder rule of linuted scope when the alternative is to
risk triggering an even harsher version.'" In today's climate, such a fear
is not unfounded. It could account further for the endurance of felony-
murder.
C. The State of the Law
The classic felony-murder rule held that a death caused during the
cominussion of any felony constitutes murder. 45 One not schooled in the
intricacies of contemporary statutes and judge-made doctrines pertinent to
felony-murder might assume that the broad, original version is still
generally the law That is far from the case. While the breadth of the
doctrine varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, a number of restrictions
limit most modern incarnations of felony-murder. 1" This proclivity for
felony-murder only when the legislature has not written the doctrine into law. For example,
the California Supreme Court rejected the argument that it should abolish the first degree
rule because it concluded that the state legislature had intended to incorporate a "first degree
felony-murder rule" in the penal code. See People v Dillon, 668 P.2d 697, 714-15 (Cal.
1983) (en banc) (concluding that first degree felony-murder is "creature of statute"). The
California court, however, reached a contrary conclusion with regard to the second degree
felony-murder rule. The court did not believe that the legislature specifically included a
second degree felony-murder rule in the code. Although the court did not deny that it has
the power to abolish that rule, it did not think it was advisable to do so. See People v
Patterson, 778 P.2d 549, 554 (Cal. 1989) (declining Government's invitation to "determine
the continued vitality" of "judicially created" second degree felony-murder rule).
144. Particularly during the 1960s and 1970s, and even in the early 1980s, a majority
of the California Supreme Court was undeniably hostile to the felony-murder rule. The
court limited the second degree felony-murder rule in every way that it could, but refrained
from abolishing the doctrine. I have always suspected that a partial explanation of the
court's hesitance was the fear that a reactionary legislature would have responded to
eradication with a broader and judicially untouchable felony-murder rule.
145. See supra text accompanying note 15.
146. See FLETCHER, supra note 10, § 4.4.4, at 293 (observing that dominant trend is
toward limitation and refinement of rule); Crump & Crump, supra note 8, at 377 (noting
that there is widespread agreement of need for limitation of felony-murder doctrine); Roth
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confining the rule is often the product of hostility to the rule itself. 47 Some
maintain that the consistent determlnation to restrict felony-murder leads
logically to the abolition of the doctrine." Others disagree. 149 As I see it,
the limitations placed on felony-murder's operation are another reason for
its survival.
An unlimted felony-murder rule could make us confront a number of
unsettling outcomes in individual cases. Individuals engaged in felonies that
are neither risky nor inherently mmoral could be convicted of murder for
consequential killings. Such convictions would probably not be frequent,
but could occur often enough and would, by their nature, attract sufficient
publicity to disconcert more than a few The number of individuals
punished without fault and the disparity between fault and the punishment
mposed would both increase and, consequently, be harder to ignore. Even
& Sundby, supra note 2, at 446 (stating that most states have tried to limit harshness of
doctrine by limiting scope of its operation).
147 This hostility manifests itself in the pejorative and highly antagonistic language
found in the opinons that have propounded and applied the restrictions upon the scope and
operation of the rule. See, e.g., People v Burroughs, 678 P.2d 894, 897 (Cal. 1984)
(opining in course of opinion invoking highly restrictive inherent dangerousness limitation
that "court has long held the felony-murder rule in disfavor" and that application of felony-
murder rule to facts of case "would be an unwarranted extension of this highly 'anachronis-
tic' notion" (footnote omitted)); People v Smith, 678 P.2d 886, 888 (Cal. 1984) (asserting
m course of opinion imposing merger limitation that court's "opinions have repeatedly
emphasized that-felony murder, although the law of this state, is a disfavored doctrine" that
"anachromstically resurrects from a bygone age a 'barbaric' concept" and that "it erodes the
relation between criminal liability and moral culpability" (quoting Dillon, 668 P.2d at 709
(quoting People v Phillips, 414 P.2d 353, 360 n.6 (Cal. 1966) and People v Washington,
402 P.2d 130, 134 (Cal. 1965)))); People v Satchell, 489 P.2d 1361, 1365 (Cal. 1971)
(stating that "we have sought to insure" that concept "of strict criminal liability incorpo-
rate[d] in the felony-murder doctrine be given the narrowest possible application consistent
with its ostensible purpose" while applying inherent dangerousness restriction); People v.
Phillips, 414 P.2d 353, 360 (Cal. 1966) (observing in course of opinion applying inherent
dangerousness restriction that "felony murder doctrine expresses a highly artificial concept
that deserves no extension beyond its required application" and that it "has been subjected
to severe and sweeping criticism").
148. See People v Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304, 316 (Mich. 1980) (concluding that
limitations and modifications of scope and operation of rule call into question its continued
existence); Crump & Crump, supra note 8, at 393 (noting argument that limitations on
felony-murder doctrine reflect such dissatisfaction as to suggest outright abolition as logical
conclusion).
149 See Crump & Crump, supra note 8, at 394-96 (maintaining that limitations are not
basis for abolition and that abrogation should not be considered logical conclusion of
principled limitations imposed on felony-murder doctrine).
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those devoted to law and order might have sympathy with felons caught in
the sweep of so broad a rule. The unfairness and extreme inconsistency
with common notions of culpability could give felony-murder opponents the
support that they lack and an impetus for abolition."5
An unlimited felony-murder rule, however, is not the law of our land.
In most places, the rule is cabined in a number of ways. A brief review of
typical restraints put upon the rule is in order.
An apparent majority of jurisdictions provides that only a short list of
specified or enumerated felonies can be the foundation of a felony-murder
conviction.' Others are a bit broader, but confine the operation of the rule
to felonies "inherently dangerous to human life."'52 Most jurisdictions
apparently follow some form of the "merger" doctrine, 53 a restriction that
precludes certain particularly dangerous felomes-the archetype is assault
with a deadly weapon-from qualifying."5  The vast majority also bars
felony-murder convictions when someone other than a felon performs the
actual lethal act, even though the act is causally connected to the felony 155
150. Cf. FLETCHER, supra note 10, § 4.4.7, at 308 (observing that third party kill-
ing/proximate cause cases that broadened felony-murder liability shocked sensibilities of
lawyers and "generated momentum" toward restrictions on rule).
151. See Aaron, 299 N.W.2d at 316 n.79 (observing that "the majority of states which
have a statutory felony-murder rule enumerate the felomes"); LAFAvE & SCOTT, supra note
3, at 625 (noting that most modem codes limit operation of felony-murder rule to certain
specified felonies); Seibold, supra note 9, at 138 (stating that clear majority of jurisdictions
linut application of rule to homicides occurring during statutorily enumerated felonies). For
examples of such statutes, see ALAsKA STAT. § 11-41.110(a)(3) (Supp. 1993) (limiting
felony-murder doctrine to enumerated felonies); ARIz. REv STAT. ANN. § 13-1105(A)(2)
(Supp. 1993) (enumerating felonies that constitute bases for first degree murder, which is
only felony-murder provision m state); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-1(2)-(3) (Burns 1994)
(listing felonies that can provide foundations for felony-murder convictions).
152. See Sudduth, supra note 4, at 1305 (observing that many courts have limited
felonies that trigger rule to those that are dangerous to human life); Barbre, supra note 15,
at 399-409 (discussing judicially-developed inherently dangerous limitation). For examples
of cases explaining and applying the limitation, see People v Patterson, 778 P.2d 549 (Cal.
1989); People v. Phillips, 414 P.2d 353 (Cal. 1966); Jenkins v State, 230 A.2d 262 (Del.
1967); State v Underwood, 615 P.2d 153 (Kan. 1980).
153. See KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 6, at 531 (observing that "great majority
of jurisdictions" have some type of merger limitation).
154. See, e.g., People v Smith, 678 P.2d 886, 888-92 (Cal. 1984) (concluding that
assaultive-variety child abuse merges into resultant homicide and cannot serve as predicate
for felony-murder doctrine); People v Ireland, 450 P.2d 580, 589-91 (Cal. 1969) (holding
that assault with deadly weapon merges and cannot be basis for felony-murder conviction).
155. See, e.g., People v Washington, 402 P.2d 130, 133 (Cal. 1965) (asserting that
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Several do not allow felony-murder prosecutions when the homicide victim
is one of the felons.' 56 This sampling of the major restrictions" indicates
how truly confined the rule is and, thus, how far we have departed from the
classic statement.
All of these restrictions on felony-murder certainly dirmnsh the
frequency of the rule's application. Equally important, they mean that few
convictions, if any, will correspond to the model sometimes thought to
epitomize the injustice of felony-murder. That is not to say that felony-
murder prosecutions and convictions will be entirely consistent with notions
of fairness and justice implicit in our modem understanding of culpability
To some extent, most felony-murder convictions will be inconsistent with
those notions. The point is that the injustices are not as egregious as those
that would result from an unlimited felony-murder scheme.'58 Few
penal code requires felon or accomplice to "commit the killing"); State v Canola, 374 A.2d
20, 27-30 (N.J. 1977) (concluding that state's murder statute did not contemplate conviction
when nonfelon performed lethal act); Commonwealth er reL Smith v. Myers, 261 A.2d 550,
552-60 (Pa. 1970) (overruling prior decision adopting proximate cause approach and
confining felony-murder doctrine to killings by felons).
156. See, e.g., People v Kittrel, 786 P.2d 467, 469 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989) (citing
statute that provides culpability only for "the death of a person, other than one of the
participants"); Jackson v. State, 589 P.2d 1052, 1052-53 (N.M. 1979) (deciding that felony-
murder rule applies when individual resisting felony kills another innocent person, but not
when such resisting individual kills felon).
157 Other limitations on the rule include the requirement that the homicide be m the
course of and/or in furtherance of the felony, see, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-2(a)(3) (1994)
(providing that felony-murder rule is applicable to killings "in the course of and m
furtherance of the crime"); ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.110(a)(3) (Supp. 1993) (providing for
felony-murder for killings "in the course of or in furtherance of" certain enumerated
felomes); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 636(a)(6) (Supp. 1992) (providing for rule to govern
killings "in the course of and in furtherance of" any enumerated felony), the demand that
the felony be mala in se or a common-law felony, see, e.g., Reddick v Commonwealth,
33 S.W 416, 417 (Ky 1895) (concluding that arson is malum in se and therefore capable
of supporting felony-murder conviction); People v. Pavlic, 199 N.W 373, 374 (Mich. 1924)
(observing that sale of liquor is only criminal because it is made so by statute and, therefore,
that it cannot support felony-murder conviction); Commonwealth v Exler, 89 A. 968, 969-
71 (Pa. 1914) (stating that because statutory rape was not common-law felony, it could not
be basis of felony-murder conviction); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 1 (West
1990) (limiting felony-murder to those felonies that are punishable by death or life
imprisonment), and the "proximate cause" limitation, see, e.g., State v Mauldin, 529 P.2d
124, 125-27 (Kan. 1974); State v. Severs, 759 S.W.2d 935, 938 (Tenn. Crnn. App. 1988).
158. Cf. People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304, 316 (Mich. 1980) (noting that numerous
modem restrictions on common-law felony-murder doctrine "reflect dissatisfaction with
harshness and ijustice of the rule"); MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 commentary at 31-32
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"innocent" felons are caught m today's felony-murder traps. Rather, based
on the proof required for a felony-murder conviction, most are chargeable
with some level of fault for the death caused.'59 In addition, in some cases,
the State could have proven actual malice on the part of the individual
convicted of felony-murder."6° For those defendants, the rule does no more
than streamline prosecutions' and deprive them of the benefits of possible,
though likely invalid, mens rea defenses. 62
In sum, the evolved restrictions on the scope of felony-murder have
probably contributed to its endurance. By keeping it on a leash, legislatures
and courts have prevented it from behaving in ways that could attract public
attention and antipathy A rule with considerable roots in our nation's legal
history and with such undeniable political appeal is only likely to be
overthrown if it transgresses in some flagrant way Modem American
felony-murder doctrines have kept the rule from doing so.
(1980) (asserting that application of felony-murder rule to wide range of felonies that exist
today would yield "startling results," which explains limitations unposed on rule); id. at 41
(observing that jurisdictions retaining felony-murder generally have excluded "egregious
applications" of rule); Roth & Sundby, supra note 2, at 447 (arguing that limiting scope of
felony-murder increases probability that those convicted are in fact guilty of some form of
criminal homicide); Seibold, supra note 9, at 162 (suggesting that ameliorative limitations
serve to make felony-murder rule "more humane and more rational").
159. See Dickey et al., supra note 71, at 1365 (stating that courts have devised schemes
that limit rule to circumstances in which defendant has or is presumed to have culpable
mental state); Paul H. Robinson, Imputed Criminal Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 609, 624-25
(1984) (observing that various restrictions on felony-murder support imputation of liability
because they increase likelihood that individual will have culpable state of mind); Roth &
Sundby, supra note 2, at 447 (asserting that limiting scope of felony-murder increases
probability that convicted defendant is in fact guilty of some level of criminal homicide);
Seibold, supra note 9, at 161 (stating that inherent dangerousness limitation "heightens the
felon's culpability for the results of his actions").
160. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 commentary at 37 (1980) (concluding that in
vast majority of cases, killings during felonies probably amount to murder apart from
operation of felony-murder rule); Roth & Sundby, supra note 2, at 491 (observing that
imposition of requirement that culpability be proven for murder may not change result in
many felony-murder cases because malice may be found).
161. See Robinson, supra note 159, at 654-55 (describing theory that felony-murder is
justified on ground of relieving prosecution of burden of actually proving culpabilities that
are present m most cases of killings during felonies).
162. See Seibold, supra note 9, at 142 (observing that in situations in which mens rea
required for murder is provable, felony-murder rule poses obstacles to defenses that
defendant otherwise might have).
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D Popular Conceptions of Culpability and Responsibility
I have saved the most interesting, important, and, I believe, influential
of the forces behind felony-murder for last. A main premise of this Article
and of scholarly and judicial attacks on felony-murder is that the doctrine
is inconsistent with culpability principles. The doctrine is clearly dissonant
with the premises generally accepted by those who study our criminal law
Although those premises are also accepted by the populace and by
lawmakers to a certain extent, I have little doubt that they do not constitute
a complete picture of the notions of fault, blame, and criminal responsibility
that reform the public conscience. Different understandings and concep-
tions of culpability-understandings and conceptions that are not widely
accepted by the scholarly community-probably underlie and help explain
our abiding allegiance to felony-murder. 6
Modem jurisprudence, for example, rejects the idea that a person is
blameworthy sunply because he has caused societal harm.16 The essence
of the mens rea demand is that there be a culpable mental attitude that
accompanies and coincides with the infliction of harm. While actual harm
can be significant,"6 it is not even a requisite basis for blame." Mental
163. See Crump & Crump, supra note 8, at 363 (discussing "societal perceptions,"
"societal judgment," and "societal attitudes" that modem felony-murder doctrine reflects);
id. at 395 (observing that public opinion polls and jury surveys suggest that populace does
not agree with judicial assessments of injustice of felony-murder rule); cf. People v Aaron,
299 N.W.2d 304, 317 (Mich. 1980) (asserting that felony-murder gives rise to "emotional
reaction" that is not based in logic or abstract principles and that it is "based on [a] rough
moral notion").
164. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 commentary at 36 (1980) (asserting that criminal
law does not generally predicate homicide liability on causation of death, but requires guilty
mind that makes result "reprehensible as well as unfortunate"); Fletcher, supra note 2, at
428 (criticizing notion that punishment should "fit not the crime, but the result for which
the offender is not personally to blame"); Schulhofer, supra note 52, at 1602 (stating that
occurrence of harm has no apparent bearing on person's moral blameworthiness).
165. See FLETCHER, supra note 10, § 5.2.2, at 362 (suggesting that causation of harm
does have bearing on appropriate level of just punishment).
Unless a junsdiction follows the Model Penal Code's lead and crimmalizes "reckless
endangerment," see MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.2 (1980), a person who behaves in a grossly
reckless manner that endangers human life, but luckily causes no harm, has no criminal
liability. Another individual who performs the same acts with the same mental attitude, but
has the bad fortune to cause a death, can, however, be liable for murder. See supra text
accompanying notes 5, 36, and 39. The causation of harm has an obvious and dramatic
effect on liability
166. For example, a person can be found guilty of attempted murder, and be punished
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fault, however, is essential. 67
I would not contend that people believe that criminal pumshment
generally ought to be based on the causation of harm alone.' 68 I would
suggest, however, that ordinary citizens place a greater emphasis on harm
than the scholarly community An injury to another person is a weighty
factor m the balances struck by the public. The more serious the injury is,
the weightier the factor is. There is no need to pay a person back or to
make a person pay merely because of the damage done, but damage makes
us begin to think along those lines and generates an inclination to
respond.169
In sum, the public view of the relative significance of harm and mental
attitude is different from that of the scholarly community Loss of life is
the most serious harm of all. By causing a death, a potential felony-
murderer primes the balance and readies it to be tipped m favor of
punishment. 170
quite severely, if he completely misses his target and inflicts no damage whatsoever. In
fact, it is not even critical that the individual do everything that he intended to do. It is
enough that the acts committed amounted to more than "mere preparation." See LAFAVE
& SCOTr, supra note 3, at 431 ("It is commonly stated that more than an act of preparation
must occur."). In other words, one can sometimes be guilty of a serious offense without
even coming close to actually causing harm.
167 See Aaron, 299 N.W.2d at 316 (opining that most basic criminal law principle is
that liability for causing result is not justifiable without culpable mental state with regard to
result); MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 commentary at 36 (1980) (concluding that because
murder is heinous offense with grave sanctions, it must be premised on confluence of guilty
act and guilty mind).
168. According to Professor Fletcher, in our distant past, it was thought proper to
punish a person simply because he brought about a harm of "transcendent" significance.
See FLETCHER, supra note 10, § 5.3.1, at 382.
169. To distinguish it from "retribution"-the idea that punishment should be
commensurate with mental fault-commentators have called the notion that liability should
be related to the harm done by names other than "harm-based retributivism." Professor
Schulhofer refers to it as "retaliation." Schulhofer, supra note 52, at 1571. Others have
called it "expiation," see Crump & Crump, supra note 8, at 368, and "vengeance," see
Note, TortLaw, supra note 4, at 1932. Whatever its name, the public possesses a certain
attachment to the concept. That attachment is part of the substructure of the felony-murder
rule.
170. Cf. FLETCHER, supra note 10, § 4.1, at 240-42 (maintaining that felony-murder
is reflection of residual influence of harm-oriented approach to homicide law); Seibold,
supra note 9, at 151 (observing that felony-murder is compatible with retributive system
because it allows stiff punishment to be imposed on person who contributes to another's
death).
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The public clearly is not convinced of the merits of a purely harm-
based retributivism. Wholly accidental killings by otherwise innocent
persons are not crmnalized, and there is no reason to think that they ever
will be. 171 No matter the number of deaths caused, we excuse such persons
because we can attribute no fault to them.l Scholars and the public agree
that, except m the special cases presented by public-welfare type criunal
enactments, accidents should not be puished.
There may well be a difference, however, m how those who study the
criminal law and those who elect lawmakers define accidents. Both groups
agree that an innocent driver whose vehicle malfunctions in a way that was
wholly unforeseeable has killed accidentally Scholars, however, would say
the same of an individual engaged in a felonous enterprise.lr Because the
felon was not negligent, his or her killing was an "accident" by definition.
On that point, the public probably disagrees. "Accidental" means
innocent, and "innocent" means without fault. The public does not perceive
a nonnegligent killing during a felomous endeavor to be lacking in fault.
A person who engages m a criminal and likely quite mimoral act is not
"innocent." But for the willing choice to engage in the act, the occasion for
the death would not have arisen. Because the felon is morally responsible
for creating the situation-in both a "but-for" and "proximate" sense, she
guiltily engendered it-she is morally responsible for the killing. 74
171. In other words, if a person who is not engaged m a criminal endeavor takes the
life of another without negligence, there can be no homicide liability Our society today
does not believe that such wholly innocent killers are proper targets of criminal sanctions,
and it is not likely to change its view in the future.
172. The primary theoreucal reason that we do not punish is the lack of fault.
Additionally, it might well be futile as a practical matter to try to affect similar future
conduct by those persons and others like them. The argument is that a person cannot, or
is not likely to, do more than refrain from careless behavfor that creates foreseeable risks
of harm.
173. See People v Satchell, 489 P.2d 1361, 1365 (Cal. 1971) (noting that ostensible
purpose of felony-murder rule is to deter felons from "killing negligently or accidentally");
People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304, 327 (Mich. 1980) (concluding that when death during
felony is "accidental," imposition of felony-murder liability is unjust); Roth & Sundby,
supra note 2, at 447-48 (United States is "virtually the only western country still recognizing
a rule which makes it possible 'that the most serious sanctions known to law might be
imposed for accidental homicide."' (quoting John C. Jeffries, Jr. & Paul B. Stephan, I,
Defenses, Presumptions, and Burden of Proof in the Criminal Law, 88 YALE L.J. 1325,
1383 (1979))).
174. See FLETCHER, supra note 10, § 4.4.1, at 277 (discussing original nature of
felony-murder rule as device that rendered claim of accident unavailable and concluding that
it was "not implausible to deny [such] an excuse to someone who has acted wrongfully in
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To the public's eye, there is a marked difference between innocent
persons who kill without negligence and guilty persons who kill without
negligence.175 Notwithstanding what scholars might say, these two types of
killers do not belong in the same category Scholarly logic considers it
irrational to treat them differently Popular logic considers it irrational to
treat them alike. It may be appropriate for the criminal law to ignore a
death due to an innocent's accident. It is not appropriate, however, to do
so when a felon volitionally and guiltily brings about the occasion of the
"accidental" death. For doing so, the felon deserves a stigma and
sanction. ,76
It would seem that while the populace accepts the general premise
behind the notion of mens rea-that there must be moral fault for there to
be criminal liability-it does not concur with the scholarly understanding of
blameworthiness m all respects. 1" In particular, the public does not adhere
creating the situation").
175. See Cole, supra note 8, at 122 (opining that taking life-threatening risks during
criminal activities is fundamentally different from taking same risks in connection with legal
activities).
176. This explanation of the popular thinking that supports felony-murder parallels
Professor Fletcher's explanation of the original understanding of the concept of felony-
murder. According to Fletcher, the notion arose at a time when any killing was
presumptively a murder. See FLETCHER, supra note 10, § 4.4.1, at 276. The presumption
of murder liability, however, was qualified by the availability of excuses. Malice was not
an affirmative basis for finding one guilty of murder, but rather was an expression of the
absence of all excusing conditions. See id. The fact that one had killed during an unlawful
act was a "rejoinder to the defensive claim of accidental killing." Id. at 277 Felony-
murder served as a basis for denying an excuse-accident-that would otherwise have been
available for a murder charge because it seemed fitting "to deny the excuse to. someone who
ha[d] acted wrongfully in creating the situation in which the excuse [was to] be asserted."
Id.
David and Susan Crump approach the issue from a slightly different angle.
According to them, felony-murder "reflects a societal judgment that an intentionally
committed robbery that causes the death of a human being is qualitatively more serious than
an identical robbery that does not." Crump & Crump, supra note 8, at 363.
Professor Fletcher has criticized the notions that the basis for blaming the defendant
lies in the commission of the felony itself and that engagement in the felony itself lowers the
threshold of moral responsibility as "unrefined" ways of thinking about criminal
responsibility. See Fletcher, supra note 2, at 426-27; see also PACKER, supra note 113, at
127 (calling it "incompatible] with the spirit of mens rea" to conclude that felon acts at peril
of liability for consequences of his actions because he has chosen to engage in wrongful
conduct).
177 See Crump & Crump, supra note 8, at 366 (asserting that mens rea alone does not
reflect society's understanding of function and purpose of criminal law and that actus reus
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to the demand for proof of mens rea for every essential element of every
offense. Applied specifically to homicide, this means that for the public,
liability does not depend upon proof of a culpable mental state regarding
the "killing of another human being" element. There are other sources of
blameworthiness for inflicting harm. One alternative source is a culpable
mental attitude toward precipitation of the events that caused the harm.
The point is not that the public entirely rejects the understandings of
culpability dominant in the scholarly community Much of our operative
criminal law reflects those understandings. Rather, the point is that the
public supplements those conceptions with others, some of which have
ancient roots in the law and in our psyches.
17 1
There is yet another difference in the scholarly and popular philoso-
phies of blame and punishment. Scholars are appropriately concerned
with avoiding punishment more severe than a felon deserves. 179  This
concern leads them to conclude that felons should be sanctioned for their
felomes, but not for accidental killings brought about by those felonies.
The public, however, even if it did accept the description of a non-
negligent death during a felony as "accidental," would probably be less
concerned about imposing an "undeserved" sanction upon the felon. To
the public, the injustice of holding an innocent person criminally liable for
an accidental killing is evident and dramatic. The injustice of holding a
"similar" felon criminally liable for the homicide is not. A murder label
and sanction are simply not as harmful or troubling when attached to and
and result are also relevant determinants of just disposition in society's eyes); rd. at 360
(suggesting that public officials who perpetuate felony-murder doctrine may know something
that scholars do not).
178. Professor Fletcher explains that criminal liability originally hinged solely on the
harm done, rather than culpability, because the "harm-doer" was "tainted," and the objective
was "expiation" rather than blame. See FLETCHER, supra note 10, § 4.1, at 237-39;
Fletcher, supra note 2, at 426-27 I believe that the public still finds the notions of "taint"
and "expiation" somewhat attractive and that they continue to influence and shape our
criminal law. See also Roth & Sundby, supra note 2, at 458 (observing that ideas that one
who does bad acts cannot complain about punishment for consequences and that retribution
should focus on resulting harm, not actor's mental state, can find roots m seventeenth and
eighteenth century conceptions of criminology).
179. See Fletcher, supra note 2, at 426, 427-28 (asserting that punishment is just only
insofar as it is proportionate to fault and that basic principle of just punishment is that it
must be proportional to wrongdoing); Roth & Sundby, supra note 2, at 458-59 (noting basic
premise that criminal law is not only concerned with guilt and innocence in abstract, but
also with degree of criminal liability, and referring to "progressive trend of categorizing
homicides according to culpability").
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imposed upon an individual already stigmatized as a felon and punished
for a felony "
Also probably inextricable from the public consciousness is the idea
that felons-by virtue of their choices to engage in felomes-have
effectively forfeited any entitlement to close scrutiny of their blameworthi-
ness. ' If a person with dirty hands causes a death he may not insist on
the inquiry into and finding of fault to which he would ordinarily be
entitled. We are simply less sympathetic to, and not as inclined to listen
to, felons' claims of innocent accident. It serves them right to have their
pleas ignored; they asked for such treatment by deciding to violate the
law 182
Legal scholars demand that homicide convictions and sanctions be
proportionate to the level of culpability or fault proven.183 Undoubtedly,
the public is also concerned with proportionality-with liability that
corresponds to mental fault and to harm done. The structure of our extant
criminal law reflects that concern. S8 I believe, however, that there are at
180. The intent here is not to suggest that the additional stigma and sanction for the
homicide are not onerous for the defendant. To the contrary, conviction and punishment
for murder are quite serious and substantial impositions. The point is simply that the public
is not as troubled by such ipositions upon an individual who has already been classified
and punished as a felon. See Cole, supra note 8, at 128-29 (suggesting that false conviction
is less harmful to defendant in felony-murder situation and that false conviction may be
minimally stigmatizing to one already branded felon); Note, Tort Law, supra note 4, at
1931-32 (stating that it is easy to attribute responsibility in felony-murder situations because
state is dealing with criminal upon whom it is easier to inflict severe punishment).
181. See People v Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304, 318 (Mich. 1980) (reciting view that
underlying rationale of felony-murder is that for those who commit bad acts, it is
permissible to exclude mceties m assessing liability); cf. People v Patterson, 778 P.2d 549,
557 (Cal. 1989) (asserting that justification for felony-murder's suspension of need to prove
subjective mental fault is that when society has declared dangerous conduct to be felonious,
defendant should not be allowed to excuse himself by saying he was unaware of danger).
182. See Aaron, 299 N.W.2d at 318 (conceding that it is understandable that people feel
little compassion for felons and suggesting that lack of compassion is one reason that
underlying principles of our system are ignored); FLETCHER, supra note 10, § 4.4.1, at 285
(stating that possible "principled moral defense" of felony-murder is that people who commit
felonies should be required to assume risk of deaths during perpetration); LAFAvE & ScoTT,
supra note 3, at 632 (stating "somewhat primitive rationale" that because felon is bad
person, there is no need to worry too much about difference between intent and results).
183. See supra note 179; see also H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY 36-37
(1963) (discussifg reasons why we should honor principles that make "relative moral
wickedness" into factor that influences severity of punishment).
184. Thus, even though the harm done is the same, a person who kills another human
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least two significant differences between the perspective of legal scholars
and that of the general public. First, the public is less concerned about
precision and exactitude in gauging proportionality Second, and more
important, the public's sense of the punishment that killers in felony-murder
contexts deserve is different.
Scholarly thought holds that labels and sanctions attached to criminal
homicides and those who commit them should correspond precisely to the
proven level of mens rea.s1 According to this view, it is objectionable to
punish a person any more severely than the established culpability justifies.
For example, if the State has only proven fault for manslaughter, a murder
conviction is unacceptable. Thus, one of the serious problems with any
form of a felony-murder rule is the disproportion between the categorization
and the fault proven. The defendant has, at most, been proven culpably
negligent or reckless,ss a mental state that should lead to no worse than a
manslaughter conviction.
being with gross negligence would typically be guilty only of manslaughter or negligent
homicide, see ALA. CODE § 13A-6-4(a) (1994) (killing with "criminal negligence" constitutes
"criminally negligent homicide"); CAL. PENAL CODE § 192(b) (West 1988) (killing "without
due caution and circumspection" constitutes involuntary manslaughter), while a person who
kills another human being with gross recklessness or intent would typically be guilty of
murder, see ALA. CODE § 13A-6-2(a)(1)-(2) (1994) (intentional killings and extremely reckless
killings constitute murder); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 187(a), 188 (West 1988) (killings with
express malice, which includes intent to kill, or implied malice, which includes gross
recklessness, constitute murder). Moreover, even if two individuals act with the same level
of bad intent, the person who actually kills another will be guilty of the more serious offense
of murder, and the person who fails to kill for reasons beyond his control will be guilty of the
less serious offense of attempted murder. Compare ARIz. REV STAT. ANN. § 13-1105(A)(1),
(C) (Supp. 1993) (intentional and premeditated killing constitutes first-degree murder, which
is class 1 felony punishable by death or life imprisonment) with ARIz. REV STAT. ANN. § 13-
1001(A)(2), (C)(1) (1989) (one who intentionally does anything that "is any step in a course
of conduct planned to culminate in an offense" is guilty of attempt, and attempt to commit
class 1 felony constitutes class 2 felony); compare CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-54a (West
Supp. 1994) (intentional killing constitutes murder, which is class A felony) with CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-49(a), 53a-51 (West 1985 & Supp. 1994) (person is guilty of attempt if
he intentionally does anything that is substantial step in course of conduct planned to culminate
in crime, and attempt to commit class A felony is class B felony).
185. See Roth & Sundby, supra note 2, at 459 (referring to "progressive trend of
categorizing homicides according to culpability").
186. A manslaughter conviction may require proof of recklessness, culpable negligence,
or ordinary negligence. See supra notes 40-42. Proof of the defendant's inherently dangerous
felonious act may often be a sufficient basis for inferring one of these mental states, but not




Unless I miss my guess, popular notions of proportionality are
concerned much less about precise correspondence between culpability and
liability-especially m cases of killings by felons. As long as the individual
deserves a serious homicide sanction, it is no major cause for dismay that
the accuracy of the classification is a bit off.
More important, and related to preceding portions of this discussion,
is the fact that the public does not perceive the same degree of dispropor-
tion m felony-murder situations. A felon who kills with culpable or gross
negligence is not seen as equivalent to a nonfelon who kills with the same
mental state. In the public mind, the culpability associated with the felony
is joined with an additional measure of culpability for the homicide."8
Although a person who kills with culpable negligence plus a felomous
attitude may not be as blameworthy as a person who kills with actual
malice, he is more blameworthy than a person who kills with culpable
negligence alone. Murder is the only category that is ordinarily available
once one rises above the manslaughter level. The choice between the
excessive indulgence involved in treating the felon as a manslaughterer and
the excessive harshness inherent in classification of the felon as a
murderer 88 is an easy one for a society enamored of law and order.
These strains of popular thought concerning culpability are intertwined
and inseparable. The reason for exploring them here is not to suggest that
the public finds scholarly conceptions of fault, blame, and criminal
punishment generally unacceptable as the basis for a system of crimnal
laws. The law on the whole incorporates and is consistent with the
culpability principles predominant in scholarly thought. The point is that
there are additional premises that are integral parts of the public psycholo-
gy 189 Those premises help account for the contemporary retention of a
187 C. FLETCHER, supra note 10, § 4.4.5, at 300-01 (discussing possible justification
of "differential" or "incremental" culpability presumption in cases m which felony is
inherently dangerous to life); Crump & Crump, supra note 8, at 381 (positing concept of
"plus factor" that is supplied by commission of certain felonies and that enables felony-
murder rule to "serve the objective of proportional justice"); Robinson, supra note 159, at
644 (observing that felony-murder rule may combine causal theory of dangerous situation
with culpability theory of underlying felony to produce single "cumulative culpability" equal
to that required for murder).
188. To treat the felon as a manslaughterer is indulgent because the felon had greater
culpability than that which is necessary to render one a manslaughterer-he possessed
culpable negligence plus a felonious intent. On the other hand, treatment as a murderer is
harsh because the felon had lesser culpability than that which is required to render one a
murderer-he did not possess actual malice.
189. Evidence of the operation of these additional premises can be found in crimnal
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law doctrines other than felony-murder. If, for example, a defendant acts under a bona fide
mistaken belief regarding an essential element of an offense, but would still be guilty of a
"lesser" crime under the circumstances as she believed them to be, the law might well
accord no exculpatory significance to the mistake and might hold the defendant liable for
the more serious offense even though she lacked culpability for that offense. See People v
Lopez, 77 Cal. Rptr. 59, 63-64 (t. App.) (concluding that defendant's mistaken belief that
recipient was over 21 years of age was not defense to charge of furmishing marijuana to
minor, m part because act that defendant contemplated committing-furnishing marijua-
na-was criminal, not innocent, act), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 935 (1969). This conclusion
manifests an unwillingness to engage in precise measurement of the culpability of one who
has decided to commit some criminal act and suggests an inclination to hold one with
"unclean hands" liable for all consequences of his deeds.
Complicity law has also been influenced by the public's different slants on fault. If
a person meets the requirements necessary to qualify as an accomplice to one offense, she
might well be held responsible for any other offenses committed by the principal as long as
those offenses were "reasonably foreseeable." See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 commentary
at 313 n.43 (1985) (listing states that adopt "reasonably foreseeable" or "probable
consequence" approach). The accomplice is held liable, in essence, for her negligent
promotion of the ancillary offenses even though the culpability requirements for the offenses
themselves and the level of culpability essential to qualify as an accomplice in the first place
are both higher than negligence. See id. at 312 n.42 (discussing incongruity and injustice
of holding accomplice liable based on negligent promotion of offense "even though more is
required to convict the principal actor"); id. at 313-20 (indicating that under two dominant
views of mens rla required to qualify as accomplice to crime one must either have purpose
to promote offense or at least know that one is promoting offense). The underlying message
is that if an individual becomes an accomplice, she forfeits any entitlement to a close look
at culpability for additional, consequential harms. In other words, much like the felony-
murderer, the "guilty" accomplice assumes the risks and acts in peril of further liability
The law surrounding intoxication provides further evidence of popular culpability
principles. If an individual chooses to become intoxicated, the law will typically hold him
liable for an offense requiring conscious disregard of particular risks even if he was, due
to the intoxication, unaware of those risks. See id. § 2.08(2) (noting that even though
recklessness-awareness of nsk-is requisite for conviction of offense, if one is unaware due
to self-induced intoxication and would otherwise have been aware of risk, he is treated as
if aware of risks); id. § 2.08 commentary at 353-54 (noting that net effect of traditional
common-law rule allowing voluntary intoxication as defense against specific intent crimes,
but not against general intent crimes, is to preclude defense for crimes requiring recklessness
or negligence). In effect, the law is willing to treat the recklessness involved in drinking
as tantamount to the recklessness required for the particular offense. See id. at 359
(concluding that it is fair to postulate general equivalence between risks created by drunken
actor's conduct and risks created by his conduct in becoming drunk). In some jurisdictions,
the law will even preclude an intoxicated person from demonstrating that his faculties were
sufficiently impaired to preclude the formation of an "intent" required for the offense
charged. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 308 (1983) (allowing intoxication evidence to be
used to reduce first degree to second degree murder, but otherwise barring negation of intent
through evidence showing impairment of faculties due to voluntary intoxication); McDaniel
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doctrine descended from prior generations and compatible with modern
American politics. They help explain the inefficacy of the scholarly
community's accusations that felony-murder transgresses basic principles
and the failure of numerous efforts to overthrow the rule.
One final point merits clarification and repetition. My endeavor has
been to document the popular views that could explain felony-murder's
endurance and to describe the ways in which public and scholarly
understandings seem to diverge. It has not been my intent to endorse any
of these views. At the same time, I have tried to avoid denunciation or
dismissal. My objects have been description, explanation, and exploration.
VI. Conclusions
If it had been my task to analyze and critique the felony-murder rule,
I would have been inclined to find much fault with it and to add my voice
to the chorus of its opponents. I am steeped in a scholarly tradition that
finds the rule irreconcilable in principle with fundamentals of modern
culpability and blame. My object, however, was not to follow the well-
worn course of prior analysts. Instead, it was to investigate and discuss the
forces that have made the doctrine resistant to the many efforts to purge it
from our body of laws.
One more diatribe about the irrationalities and perils of the rule would
not have been of much service. The rule has withstood better assaults than
I could have mustered. One hope is that my approach to the subject might
inspire some new perspectives on the rule. Perhaps this effort to determine
why the rule has been able to endure will prompt both the scholarly and
lawmaking communities to see the rule in a different light and to re-
evaluate their well-entrenched biases. Perhaps those bent on reform might
v. State, 356 So. 2d 1151, 1161 (Miss. 1978) (Sugg, J., specially concumng) (concluding that
evidence of voluntary intoxication may no longer be used to disprove intent required for
specific intent defenses).
One who chooses to become voluntarily intoxicated to such an extent forfeits his right
to close scrutiny of culpability and is punished for the harmful acts that result from the
"guilty" decision to become intoxicated. In essence, these intoxication doctrines reflect the
view that a "guilty" drunken individual who causes harm without the normally required mental
state, but while in a self-induced, npaired condition, is quite unlike a truly "innocent" sober
individual who causes harm without the requisite mental state.
This discussion is not meant to provide an exhaustive list of the rules that demonstrate
popular culpability principles at work. Its object is to show that some of the premises and
understandings underlying felony-murder's persistence are well-entrenched and influential in
other areas of criminal law.
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simply be prompted to come at their task from different angles. Maybe
supporters will only be further convinced of the virtues of their position.
At the very least, I hope my modest effort will facilitate understanding of
one of the more remarkable legal phenomena of our time-the survival of
the felony-murder rule.
